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Representation in Class Suits for Money Damages 
Patrick Woolley∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, debate has raged over whether an absent class 
member may attack a class judgment for inadequate representation in 
subsequent litigation.1  The traditional understanding—dating back as far 
as Hansberry v. Lee2—has been that an absent class member who has 
been inadequately represented has the right to collaterally attack a class 
judgment.3  As Federal Practice and Procedure has noted, a decision 
                                                     
 ∗ Beck, Redden & Secrest Professor in Law, The University of Texas School of Law.  I thank 
Stephen Clarke, Jordan Harrison, and Mark Tindall for their invaluable research assistance.  Bob 
Bone, Lonny Hoffman, Jay Tidmarsh, and Rhonda Wasserman provided very helpful comments on 
an earlier draft.  I also greatly profited from comments I received at the Kansas Law Review’s 
symposium in October 2009 and at a Boalt Law School student-faculty workshop in April 2008 
where I presented an early sketch of this Article at the invitation of Stephen Bundy and Eleanor 
Swift. 
 1. For a thoughtful and relatively even-handed accounting of the debate, see William B. 
Rubenstein, Finality in Class Action Litigation: Lessons From Habeas, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 790, 820–
41 (2007). 
 2. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
 3. See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4455, at 
485 (2002); (“It has long been the general understanding that only adequate representation can 
justify preclusion against nonparticipating class members.”); id. at 487 (arguing that “[t]he 
traditional view” permitting collateral attack “should not be allowed to pass easily into the discarded 
heap of nice-but-antique procedures that are too wearisome to be endured in the press of modern 
needs”); Patrick Woolley, The Availability of Collateral Attack for Inadequate Representation in 
Class Suits, 79 TEX. L. REV. 383, 384–85, nn.2–3 (2001) (collecting extensive case law and legal 
scholarship).  See also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 395–99 (1996) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (recognizing that “[f]inal judgments . . . 
remain vulnerable to collateral attack for failure to satisfy the adequate representation requirement”).  
Numerous scholars have defended the traditional view over the last decade.  See, e.g., Debra Lyn 
Bassett, Constructing Class Action Reality, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1415, 1453 (arguing that efforts to 
“reconstruct class action reality” by limiting collateral attacks on class judgments would “undermine 
the importance of the class action’s representative nature”); Lonny S. Hoffman, Intersections of 
State and Federal Power: State Judges, Federal Law, and the “Reliance Principle,” 81 TUL. L. REV. 
283, 326–27 (2007) (noting the importance of broad collateral review and stating that “[t]he 
traditional rule—and the one accepted by most courts and commentators—is that due process 
challenges to a prior judgment may be asserted collaterally when enforcement of the judgment is 
subsequently sought”); Susan P. Koniak, How Like a Winter? The Plight of Absent Class Members 
Denied Adequate Representation, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1787, 1836–61 (2004) (vigorously 
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upholding the availability of collateral attack “seemed surprising only by 
taking such great effort to reach conclusions that many students would 
have thought clearly required by long tradition.”4  But beginning with an 
influential article criticizing that decision,5 academic critics of collateral 
attack have mounted a serious and sustained effort to change the law.6 
That effort—which has found support in some judicial opinions over 
the last decade7—has culminated in the Principles of the Law of 
                                                                                                                       
defending the traditional rule); Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit as 
an Analytical Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1037 (2003) (“[T]he basic constitutional principle has 
been to permit unnamed class members to challenge the adequacy of their representation in a 
collateral trial.”); see also David A. Dana, Adequacy of Representation After Stephenson: A 
Rawlsian/Behavioral Economics Approach to Class Action Settlements, 55 EMORY L.J. 279, 282 
(2006) (arguing that a “rule allowing subsequent challenges to class action settlements is compelled 
by our basic intuitions of fairness and justice when class members could not conceivably have 
agreed to the arrangement had they been present but not known their precise position in the class”). 
 4. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, at 485.  The treatise referred to the decision in Epstein v. 
MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997), a decision that was later vacated. 
 5. Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, The Inadequate Search for “Adequacy” in Class 
Actions: A Critique of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (1998) [hereinafter Kahan & 
Silberman, The Inadequate Search].  See also Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and 
Beyond: The Role of State Courts in Class Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 219, 277 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita] (contending that the 
argument that absent class members “are free to relitigate the issue of adequate representation and 
fairness of the settlement in their own action claims too much”) (punctuation modified); Note, 
Collateral Attack on the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REV. 589, 603–04 
(1974) (recommending that judicial findings of adequacy in the course of class proceedings be given 
preclusive effect). 
 6. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2008); Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class Representation, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 379 (2004) (arguing that the law should “reject the expansive avenues for 
collateral attack upon class judgments that some commentators understandably have drawn from the 
ill-chosen rhetoric in Shutts”) [hereinafter Nagareda, Administering Adequacy]; Woolley, supra note 
3, at 387 n. 13 (collecting authority); see also Kevin R. Bernier, Note, The Inadequacy of the Broad 
Collateral Attack: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Company and Its Effect on Class Action 
Settlements, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1023 (2003); Sara Maurer, Note, Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson: 
Class Action Catch 22, 55 S.C. L. REV. 467 (2004) (rejecting the Stephenson approach); Gregory M. 
Wirt, Comment, Missed Opportunity: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co. and the Finality of Class 
Action Settlements, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1297, 1313 (2005) (“[T]he Court should limit challenges 
to a class action settlement to a review of the procedures utilized during the settlement.”).  Some 
courts took a restrictive approach to collateral attack even before scholarly criticism mounted.  See 
Woolley, supra note 3, at 385–86 nn.4–9 (collecting cases). 
 7. Courts that have addressed collateral attack over the last decade have been split.  See, e.g., 
Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1284–89 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that collateral attack is appropriate 
with respect to class judgments in Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) suits, while acknowledging that an 
earlier Tenth Circuit case held that due process requires notice rather than adequate representation in 
Rule 23(b)(3) suits); Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d 165, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(prohibiting collateral attack if the alleged inadequacy was addressed by the class court); In re Diet 
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 431 F.3d 141, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2005) (relying on circuit precedent to reject 
collateral attack); Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257–61 (2d Cir. 2001) (authorizing 
collateral attack); Janik v. Rudy, 119 Cal. App. 4th 930, 944 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing 
that at a minimum collateral attack is permissible when the class court did not address the basis for 
the adequacy objection); Aguirre v. Albertson’s, Inc., 117 P.3d 1012, 1018 n.12 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) 
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Aggregate Litigation, which was recently approved by the American 
Law Institute.8  In sharp contrast to the longstanding position of the 
Institute,9  Aggregate Litigation seeks to narrow substantially the 
traditional availability of collateral attack for inadequate representation.  
                                                                                                                       
(citing Epstein for the proposition that “collateral second-guessing of the adequacy of notice and 
representation in a prior class action is inappropriate”); Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life 
Mut. Ins. Co., 902 A.2d 366, 382 (Pa. 2006) (citing Stephenson for the proposition that “[w]hen a 
class member collaterally attacks a class settlement by alleging that he was wrongfully included in 
the class . . . we believe the allegation should be permitted substantive collateral review because a 
class settlement does not always protect the interests of every party subject to it”); Lamarque v. 
Fairbanks Capital Corp., 927 A.2d 753, 760–65 (R.I. 2007) (adopting the view that “the extent of 
collateral review is limited to consideration of ‘whether the procedures in the prior litigation 
afforded the party against whom the earlier judgment is asserted a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the claim or issue’”); Hospitality Mgmt. Assoc., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 591 S.E.2d 611, 616–20 (S.C. 
2004) (same holding as Lamarque); Kortebein v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 79, 88 (Tex. 
App. 2001) (stating that “[d]ue process does not require collateral second-guessing” of class 
determinations) (citing Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999)); Vermont v. 
Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1017 (Vt. 2003) (“If we had to decide this case squarely on 
this issue, we would be inclined to follow the recent decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Stephenson because adequacy of representation is ‘the quintessence of due process in class 
actions.’”); Nobl Park, LLC v. Shell Oil Co., 95 P.3d 1265, 1269 & n.3, 1270–71 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2004) (entertaining a collateral attack on adequate representation after construing Epstein to mean 
that a court is not required to but may entertain a collateral attack on a class judgment).  Two 
decisions that slightly pre-date the decade and will not otherwise be mentioned should also be noted.  
See Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n absent class 
member may collaterally attack the prior judgment on the ground that to apply claim preclusion 
would deny him due process.” (citations omitted)); Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 
159 F.3d 266, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that an absent “class member could try to show in a 
collateral attack that the decision to proceed before a magistrate judge was a matter on which there 
was a potential (or, in the light of the fully developed record, an actual) significant intra-class 
conflict and that the notice the absentee received was inadequate to inform her of this conflict”). 
 8. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (Proposed Final Draft 2009) 
[hereinafter AGGREGATE LITIGATION].  The proposed final draft was approved for publication as the 
official text of the Principles “subject to the discussion at . . . the 2008 [and 2009] Annual 
Meeting[s] and also to editorial prerogative.”  See www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
meetings.annual_updates_09 (last visited Dec. 9, 2009).  In textual references, I refer to the proposed 
final draft as Aggregate Litigation. 
 9. The First Restatement of Judgments is crystal clear: “Where a person is not a party to a 
class action, the judgment therein has conclusive effect against him only if his interests were 
adequately represented. . . . A person as to whom a class action is ineffective is not required to seek 
relief during the continuance of the action.”  RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 116 cmt. b (1942).  The 
Second Restatement is in accord: 
[N]otice concerning designation of a representative is an invitation to dispute the 
propriety of the designation and does not foreclose the notified party from later 
contesting the adequacy of the representation and on that basis avoiding the conclusive 
effect of a judgment involving the representative.  The purpose of offering opportunity to 
dispute the fitness of the representative is to permit anticipation of the possibility of 
subsequent attack on his authority and thus to assure as far as possible that the judgment 
in the action will have conclusive effects. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. b (1982) (contrasting the use of notice in class 
actions with process in ordinary litigation); cf. id. at cmt. e reporter’s note (citing Hansberry for the 
proposition that “[t]he finding of divergence of interest may, of course, be made on collateral 
challenge” (emphasis added)). 
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Specifically, Aggregate Litigation argues that collateral attack should be 
prohibited unless the class court “failed to make the necessary findings 
of adequate representation, or failed to afford class members reasonable 
notice and an opportunity to be heard as required by applicable law.”10  
Aggregate Litigation provides little assistance in defining what 
constitutes “the necessary findings of adequate representation,”11 but the 
goal clearly is to move away from the traditional rule that absent class 
members are not bound by the finding of the class court that they have 
been adequately represented. 
Aggregate Litigation also seeks to rewrite the constitutional meaning 
of “adequacy of representation,” defining it exclusively in terms of 
“structural conflicts.”12  In support of that position, the Reporters point to 
an article written by two of them—Samuel Issacharoff and Richard 
Nagareda.13  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda draw a sharp 
distinction in that article between “structural defects” and “performance 
defects” in the representation of a class and argue that even a limited 
form of collateral attack should be available only when inadequate 
representation is caused by a structural defect.14 
I published an article a decade ago arguing that the efforts to limit 
collateral attacks were inconsistent with the proper interpretation of class 
action rules and the Constitution.15  In this Article, I revisit the issue of 
                                                     
 10. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 3.14(a)(2).  Aggregate Litigation also recognizes 
that a collateral attack is permissible if the court rendering the class judgment lacks subject-matter or 
personal jurisdiction.  Id.  As I have long argued, states lack power under the Constitution to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over absent class members who have been inadequately represented, unless 
those class members have minimum contacts with the forum; it seems clear that Aggregate 
Litigation does not agree.  Id., § 3.14 cmt. a (noting that postjudgment challenges may be 
permissible if the court lacked personal jurisdiction but insisting that “[t]his Section does not 
approve of postjudgment challenge as a vehicle for relitigating findings of adequacy of 
representation that were made prior to judgment by the court approving the settlement”). 
 11. Id. § 3.14(a)(2). 
 12. Id. § 2.07 cmt. d.  Structural conflicts are defined narrowly by Aggregate Litigation as those 
that “present a significant risk that the conduct of the litigation will be skewed systematically—that 
is, in some direction predictable before the determination of related claims on an aggregate basis.”  
Id. 
 13. Id. § 2.07 cmt. d reporters’ notes.  In their article, Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda 
carefully note: “The views stated herein represent our shared assessment as commentators, not 
necessarily the position of the ALI.”  Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1649 n.††.  The other 
Reporters were Robert Klonoff and Charles Silver.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 1677–1700.  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda further contend that collateral 
attacks should be available for structural defects only if the court rendering the class judgment failed 
to address adequately an argument that the structure of the class was defective.  Id. at 1714–18.  
They would also require that collateral attacks in some circumstances be filed in the rendering court.  
See id. at 1713 (“Where the class action is in a particular federal forum as a result of congressional 
determination that (1) the case is one of national-market significance, and (2) a single forum needs to 
be created, then collateral attacks should be directed to the rendering federal court.”). 
 15. Woolley, supra note 3.  I recognized that class action rules could be rewritten to limit 
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collateral attack for inadequate representation in light of the recently 
approved Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation and the 
supporting scholarship of Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda.16  In Part 
II, I critique Aggregate Litigation’s extraordinarily narrow conception of 
adequate representation and argue for an understanding that takes into 
account the performance of class counsel.17  In Part III, I challenge a 
central assumption of Aggregate Litigation’s effort to severely limit the 
availability of collateral attack—the assumption that adequate 
representation plays no role in a proper analysis of personal jurisdiction.  
I show why recognition of the jurisdictional nature of adequate 
representation is mandated by a sound understanding of the principles 
governing personal jurisdiction in United States courts.  Part III also 
explains why efforts to limit collateral attack by relying on virtual 
representation or the fiduciary role of the class court stretch the 
principles of preclusion law beyond the breaking point.  I conclude in 
Part IV. 
II. THE MEANING OF ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION 
A. A Bird’s-Eye View of the Debate 
1. The Traditional Approach to Adequate Representation 
The foundation of the traditional approach to adequate representation 
rests on the recognition that the “interest” protected by the adequate 
representation requirement is the constitutionally-protected property 
interest of an individual class member in his or her claim.18  As I have 
                                                                                                                       
collateral attack in some circumstances, but argued that sound public policy counseled against limits 
on collateral attack outside the context of structural injunctions.  Id. at 432–45. 
 16. See supra note 6.  My primary focus in this Article is on Class Settlements Under Attack, 
the article jointly published by Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda while at work on Aggregate 
Litigation.  I have previously critiqued the views expressed in Professor Nagareda’s earlier work.  
See Patrick Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement, 74 UMKC L. REV. 765 
(2006) [hereinafter Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement]; Patrick 
Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class Suits Certified Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 799 (2004) [hereinafter Woolley, 
Choice of Law]. 
 17. My first article on collateral attack gave only glancing attention to the content of the 
adequate representation requirement, Woolley, supra note 3, at 433–34, but it has since become clear 
that it is impossible to adequately address the availability of collateral attack separately from the 
content of the adequate representation requirement.  I have considered the content of the adequate 
representation requirement in two other articles.  See Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate 
Representation Requirement, supra note 16, at 771–77; Woolley, Choice of Law, supra note 16, at 
818–36.  I draw here on my discussion of adequate representation in those earlier articles. 
 18. See Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. 
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noted, “[a] claim—whether resolved by judgment after adjudication or 
sold to a defendant in settlement—has economic value premised on 
entitlements granted by law.”19  That individual class members have 
constitutionally-protected property interests in their claims does not 
mean, of course, that courts simply enforce preexisting substantive 
rights.  The adjudication of claims may require “legislative” judgments 
by courts with respect to unsettled matters of substantive law.  And in 
making these judgments, courts must consider what will most effectively 
achieve the underlying objectives of a particular statute or common-law 
rule.  Nor are courts disabled from changing their views about the 
appropriate scope of a substantive right.  But an individual with a 
constitutionally protected property interest has an entitlement to the relief 
prescribed by the substantive law. 
A class member’s property interest in his claim typically is protected 
by a representative or representatives authorized by a court to act on his 
or her behalf.20  Because it is impossible as a practical matter to ensure 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 571, 585 (1997) (“As the Supreme Court has made clear, a cause of action is a form of 
property protected by the Due Process Clause.”) (citations omitted). 
 19. Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement, supra note 16, at 771.  My 
discussion in this Article is limited to class suits seeking monetary relief.  For a brief discussion of 
the “interest” at stake in class suits seeking injunctive relief, see Woolley, supra note 18, at 586–89. 
 20. With respect to due process, I draw no distinction between the role of the “class 
representative,” (that is, a named plaintiff) and that of class counsel.  In other words, I agree with 
those who have argued that from a due process perspective, adequacy of representation should be 
“measured first and foremost by the adequacy of counsel.”  Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and 
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 354 (1999) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  I recognize that this stance is controversial.  See Linda S. Mullenix, Taking 
Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 
57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1695, 1703–11 (2004) (treating “judicial finding of both adequacy of the 
class representatives as well as of the proposed class counsel” as a due process requirement and 
criticizing the lack of attention paid to the adequacy of class representatives); see also In re General 
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 784 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The 
protection of the absentees’ due process rights depends in part on the extent the named plaintiffs are 
adequately interested to monitor the attorneys (who are, of course, presumed motivated to achieve 
maximum results by the prospect of substantial fees) . . . .”).  I accept that in class suits asserting 
high-value claims, a class representative can serve a useful role in monitoring the work of class 
counsel.  Cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1991) (arguing that in negative-value suits “no rational plaintiff would take on the 
role of litigation monitor because she would incur all the costs of doing so but would realize only her 
pro rata share of the benefits”).  But I do not believe that a monitoring role for named plaintiffs is 
sufficiently fundamental to be deemed a requirement of due process.  The Supreme Court seems to 
share this view.  In Taylor v. Sturgell, the Court held that preclusion based on adequate 
representation requires that “either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative 
capacity or the original court took care to protect the nonparty’s interests.”  128 S. Ct. 2161, 2165 
(2008) (emphasis added).  In other words, the Court concluded that the plaintiff need not be aware of 
her representative capacity if the court otherwise protects the interests of a nonparty.  See also Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (insisting on separate representation of class members 
with conflicts of interest to “eliminate conflicting interests of counsel” (emphasis added)).  Lower 
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that the representative’s interests will be perfectly aligned with that of an 
absent class member (let alone that the representation will flawlessly 
advance the interests of the absent class member), the law requires only 
adequate representation.  But to the extent practicable, adequate 
representation must be defined in a manner designed to protect the 
property interests of individual class members in their claims.21  
Generally speaking, settlements in class suits for money damages should 
respect the relative economic value of individual claims or categories of 
individual claims.  To give class counsel broad discretion to disregard the 
relative value of class claims would essentially permit class counsel to 
rewrite the substantive law; that class counsel has no authority to do.  
The Court recognized this fundamental principle in Amchem and Ortiz, 
rejecting those settlements in substantial part on the ground that they did 
not adequately protect the value of claims held by certain class 
members.22 
Because the “interest” to be protected in a class suit is the interest of 
each individual in the economic value of his or her claim, the conflicts of 
interest to be avoided are those that would create an unacceptable risk 
that an absent class member will not recover the economic value of his or 
her claim.  But courts also have an obligation to ensure that unavoidable 
conflicts of interest do not prejudice absent class members.  Class 
counsel similarly has a duty to exercise reasonable care and due 
diligence in protecting the economic value of all the individual claims 
within the representation.23 
                                                                                                                       
courts seem to be moving in the same direction.  See Robert H. Klonoff, The Judiciary’s Flawed 
Application of Rule 23’s “Adequacy of Representation” Requirement, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 671, 
678 (2004) (noting critically “the holding by 228 courts (about 30 percent of the cases ruling on 
adequacy) during the 10-year period studied that class representatives were per se adequate because 
their claims did not conflict with those of the class”).  I do not consider whether Rule 23—as 
opposed to the Due Process Clause—requires that named plaintiffs actively act as fiduciaries of the 
class.  Cf. James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in 
Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1600 (2006) (stating that the Private Securities 
Litigation Act “empowers the lead plaintiff to ‘select and retain’ counsel with the approval of the 
court, which envisions the possibility that the lead plaintiff may substitute counsel so as to bring an 
early conclusion to the case” (footnote omitted)). 
 21. It is for this reason that I reject the “hypothetical consent standard” formulated by Geoffrey 
Miller.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, Conflicts of Interest in Class Action Litigation: An Inquiry into the 
Appropriate Standard, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 581, 596 (2003) (“[B]ecause the reasonable plaintiff 
is shielded from knowledge of her position, the hypothetical consent standard requires that the 
decision be in the best interest of the class as a whole . . . .”). 
 22. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 864–65; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620–29 (1997). 
 23. In a counterfactual world in which all interested parties knew that a class suit would be 
litigated to judgment, assessing the adequacy of representation would be relatively easy.  In such a 
world, conflicts of interest within the class would be less likely, though certainly not out of the 
question; counsel often should be able to vigorously pursue judgment for every member of the class 
without negatively affecting any other member of the class.  Nor would conflicts between counsel 
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2. The Aggregate Litigation Approach 
One of the most striking features of Aggregate Litigation is its effort 
to rewrite the law’s understanding of adequate representation—the key 
due-process concept in class litigation.  In an article cited by Aggregate 
Litigation on this point, Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda distinguish 
between “structural defects” in representation, which may justify 
collateral attacks, and “performance defects,” which do not.24  Structural 
defects are conflicts that “present a significant risk that the conduct of the 
litigation will be skewed systematically—that is in some direction 
predictable prior to the determination of related claims on an aggregate 
basis.”25  That kind of defect, Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda argue, 
is of constitutional dimension because it “bespeaks a proceeding 
illegitimate from its conception.”26  By contrast, they sharply reject the 
view that a “claim of subpar performance [by counsel may] assume the 
mantle of a constitutional affront.”27  In short, Professors Issacharoff and 
Nagareda would create a hierarchy of representational defects, permitting 
even limited collateral review only with respect to “structural defects.”  
Aggregate Litigation takes the same approach.28 
                                                                                                                       
and the class as a whole be likely if counsel were to share in the recovery obtained for the class.  The 
central inquiry in such a world would often revolve around whether counsel litigated the action with 
sufficient care and skill. 
But settlement is almost always the way plaintiffs in class litigation obtain a remedy in the real 
world.  The funds a defendant is willing to set aside for settlement will usually be limited, so there 
will normally be competition among different segments of the class for limited settlement funds.  See 
Miller, supra note 21, at 602 n.71 (“An inevitable aspect of any settlement is the task of allocating 
the limited proceeds among class members.”).  Moreover, it may be possible in class suits resolved 
through settlement for class counsel to obtain (additional) attorneys’ fees by selling out the class or a 
segment of the class.  In short, the dynamics of settlement significantly increase the risk that absent 
class members will be inadequately represented. 
 24. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1659. 
 25. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d (“The objective . . . is for the court to 
determine whether conflicts of interest are such as ‘would present a significant risk that the lawyers 
for claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some claimants 
over others on grounds aside from reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to disfavor 
claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.’” (quoting id. at § 2.07(a)(1)(B))).  Although 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda use the terms “structural defect” and “performance defect,” 
Aggregate Litigation does not.  See, e.g., id. § 2.07 cmt. d (“Subsection (a)(1) casts the right of 
loyalty as the absence of structural conflicts of interest in the representation of claimants on an 
aggregate basis.”). 
 26. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1700. 
 27. Id. at 1658. 
 28. Section 2.07(a) “organizes the due-process rights of claimants in aggregate proceedings on 
related claims,” but omits any consideration of whether counsel acted with adequate skill.  
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. c.  Aggregate Litigation also rules out the use of 
collateral attack to relitigate a finding of adequate representation made by the class court prior to 
judgment.  Id. § 2.07 cmt. d (stating that Section 2.07 “consciously implies that a judicial finding of 
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The goal seems to be to promote finality by making it possible to 
determine in advance of settlement—and without considering the terms 
of the settlement—whether the adequate-representation requirement has 
been satisfied.  But this approach thoroughly misconceives the basis of 
the adequate-representation requirement.  The key constitutional question 
is not whether a decision to aggregate was legitimate ab initio,29 but 
whether it is fundamentally fair to bind a particular person to the class 
judgment.30 
Certification of a class by a court constitutes a promise that the 
interests of class members in the litigation will be adequately protected.  
As the Supreme Court explained in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, “a 
class action plaintiff is not required to fend for himself. . . .  The court 
and named plaintiffs protect his interests.”31  Because absent class 
members, relying on the promise that their interests will be protected, 
may choose not to participate in the class suit, fundamental fairness 
requires that that promise be kept if class members are to be bound.32  
But given the extraordinary emphasis that Aggregate Litigation—and 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda—place on finality,33 it is not 
                                                                                                                       
loyalty as part of the decision to aggregate—like a determination made on the merits in the aggregate 
proceeding—should have preclusive effect, unless challenged on direct appeal”); id. § 3.14 cmt. a. 
(“This Section does not approve of post-judgment challenge as a vehicle for relitigating findings of 
adequacy of representation that were made prior to judgment by the court approving the 
settlement.”). 
 29. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1657–58. 
 30. Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda conflate the authority to aggregate with the authority 
to bind.  But they are not the same.  Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940) (“It is evident that 
the considerations which may induce a court thus to proceed, despite a technical defect of parties, 
may differ from those which must be taken into account in determining whether the absent parties 
are bound by the decree or, if it is adjudged that they are, in ascertaining whether such an 
adjudication satisfies the requirements of due process and of full faith and credit.”). 
 31. 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985). 
 32. Cf. Woolley, supra note 3, at 393 n.30 and accompanying text.  To the extent that absent 
class members can be bound without notice or an opportunity to be heard, adequate representation 
serves as a substitute for the opportunity to be heard—what the Court has called the “fundamental 
requisite of due process.”  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).  I have argued elsewhere that individual class 
members who choose not to rely on the class representative are entitled to notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.  See Woolley, supra note 18, at 599–619. 
 33. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.02 cmt. e. (“[I]f a determination in the 
aggregate would occur only amidst doubts about its preclusive effect, then those concerns should 
stand as warning signs counseling strongly against aggregation in the first place.”); Issacharoff & 
Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1651 (“Our aim in this Article is to provide a cohesive framework for 
establishing the finality of class actions under the real-world conditions of settlement.”).  Professors 
Nagareda and Issacharoff argue that the “repose” offered by a settlement is a crucial part of a 
defendant’s calculations in settling a claim.  Id.  But see Dana, supra note 3, at 321–30 (arguing that 
the “chilling effect” of collateral challenges is often overstated).  In any event, the recognition that 
the availability of collateral attack may negatively affect the economic value of claims in general is 
only one factor in determining whether the legal system should make collateral attack available. 
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surprising that they choose to advance a narrow conception of adequacy, 
notwithstanding its inability to protect absent class members from 
misconduct by class counsel that cannot be predicted at the outset of the 
litigation. 
Focusing on whether the decision to aggregate was legitimate ab 
initio also has the effect of giving the court and class counsel wide 
discretion to modify the preexisting rights of class members.34  Professor 
Nagareda, for example, has argued that class suits “stand uneasily 
between the categories of rulemaking and adjudication.”35  He describes 
class settlements designed by class counsel and their defense 
counterparts as tending “to amount to a kind of privatized civil justice 
reform, positing the displacement of class members’ preexisting rights as 
delineated by legislatures or common-law courts.”36  “Class action law,” 
he contends, “should acknowledge forthrightly the power of governance 
wielded via class settlements—it should see class actions as an 
institutional rival to conventional processes of law reform . . . .”37 
Treating the class device as a form of governance validates the use of 
the class device to subordinate a class member’s interest in his or her 
individual claim to other social objectives—for example, ensuring that 
defendants are adequately deterred from engaging in future conduct the 
law has deemed harmful.  From this perspective, the details of 
compensation are less important than the effectiveness of the deterrent, 
and inadequate representation of class members is of serious concern 
only if it interferes with deterrence.38  But the decision to create 
individual causes of action gives rise to legitimate expectations that are 
entitled to constitutional protection as a form of property.39  The 
adequate representation requirement must be designed to adequately 
protect these entitlements.40 
                                                     
 34. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1658. 
 35. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 6, at 355. 
 36. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 149, 152 (2003). 
 37. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 6, at 292. 
 38. A related objective in large-scale class suits has often been to modify the rights of class 
members in a way that will make it easier to deal “fairly and efficiently” with a particular mass 
injury—a phenomenon Richard Marcus noted in the mass-tort context years ago.  Richard L. 
Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 870 
(1995) (“[The agreements] implement an alternative to the tort system that is responsive to the 
federal courts’ substantive concerns about mass torts.”). 
 39. See Woolley, supra note 18, at 585 n.64. 
 40. It should be noted that, as a practical matter, the two models I have laid out in the text 
converge in the context of negative-value claims.  By negative-value claims, I mean claims too small 
to make individual litigation worthwhile.  Because individual litigation of negative-value claims is 
impracticable, the aggregation of individual causes of action in a class suit provides absent class 
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B. The Performance of Counsel 
Aggregate Litigation—and Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda—
argue that inadequate performance of class counsel’s obligations cannot 
give rise to a constitutional defect.41  But as the Supreme Court noted as 
early as Hansberry v. Lee, the Due Process Clause is satisfied only if 
class “litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair 
consideration of the common issue.”42  This passage cannot be 
understood to simply require that good procedures be put in place or that 
class suits be free of structural conflicts.  Hansberry requires that class 
action procedure be “so devised and applied as to insure that those 
present are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation [be] 
so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the common 
issue.”43  Shutts is in accord.  If the only defects that mattered to an 
assessment of adequate representation were structural defects—that is, 
defects that “present a significant risk that the conduct of the litigation 
will be skewed systematically . . . in some direction predictable before 
the determination of related claims on an aggregate basis”44—there 
would have been no need for the Shutts Court to stress that there must be 
adequate representation “at all times.”45 
Following the Court’s lead in Hansberry, the Fifth Circuit held in 
Gonzales v. Cassidy that 
the primary criterion for determining whether the class representative 
has adequately represented his class for purposes of res judicata is 
whether the representative, through qualified counsel, vigorously and 
tenaciously protected the interests of the class.  A court must view the 
                                                                                                                       
members with an opportunity to receive compensation for injuries that would not be compensable 
otherwise.  It is certainly reasonable in that context to place greater emphasis on the deterrent aspects 
of the law in administering class suits in which individual litigation would be impracticable.  But 
with respect to positive-value class claims, the choice of model matters a great deal because the 
entitlement to the relief prescribed by law has significant value. 
 41. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1657–58 (complaining that using the term 
“adequate representation” to include performance defects “allows even a claim of subpar 
performance to assume the mantle of a constitutional affront”).  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda 
dismissively argue that “agency problems abound in all legal representation.”  Id. at 1699.  But there 
are only a handful of contexts in which the state guarantees adequate representation. 
 42. 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940) (emphasis added). 
 43. Id. (emphasis added).  See also id. at 42–43 (“It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts 
that members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where 
they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present, or where they actually participate 
in the conduct of the litigation in which members of the class are present as parties . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 44. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 45. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
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representative’s conduct of the entire litigation with this criterion as its 
guidepost.46 
“‘Vigorous’ and ‘tenacious’ protection requires, at a minimum, that 
counsel pursue their clients’ claims, make a reasonable effort to assess 
the fair settlement value of those claims, and pursue a settlement that 
approximates that value, always taking into account the ever-present 
risks of litigation.”47  The Second Restatement, for its part, requires that a 
representative act with “due diligence and reasonable prudence.”48 
                                                     
 46. 474 F.2d 67, 75 (5th Cir. 1973); see also id. at 74 (“Due process of law would be violated 
for the judgment in a class suit to be res judicata to the absent members of a class unless the court 
applying res judicata can conclude that the class was adequately represented in the first suit.” (citing 
Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 61)); Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1284–86 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that 
“[d]ue process requires adequate representation ‘at all times’ throughout the litigation” and that 
“‘[t]he question of adequate representation can best be resolved by determining whether the interests 
of those who would attack the judgment were vigorously pursued and protected in the class action by 
qualified counsel’”); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Adequate representation 
requires that counsel ‘vigorously and tenaciously protect[ ] the interests of the class.’” (quoting 
Gonzales, 474 F.2d at 75)), vacated on other grounds, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999); Key v. Gillette 
Co., 782 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming decertification of a class for lack of adequate 
representation when the “district court found that the weak presentation of the individual 
discrimination claim, the serious deficiencies in the methodology of the principal expert, the failure 
of appellant’s attorney to present the expert’s testimony in a manner that could be understood by the 
court and his general lackluster performance during trial all reflected appellant’s inability to ‘fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of her class’”); Keene v. United States, 81 F.R.D. 653, 657 (S.D. 
W. Va. 1979) (quoting Gonzales for the proposition that the general test of the adequacy of the 
representation in a class action is whether the class representative, through qualified counsel, 
“‘vigorously and tenaciously protected the interests of the class’”); Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 
F. Supp. 345, 352 (E.D. Va. 1976) (recognizing that “[t]he generally accepted standard to be 
employed for determining whether the class was adequately represented . . . is whether the class 
representatives, through their counsel, vigorously and tenaciously protected the interests of the entire 
class”), vacated sub nom. on other grounds, Lewis v. Tobacco Workers’ Int’l Union, 577 F.2d 1135 
(4th Cir. 1978); Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 534 (W.D. La. 1976) (“The 
implication of the cases concerning adequacy of representation is that a party who wishes to 
prosecute an action on behalf of a class must protect the rights and interests of absent class members 
vigorously, tenaciously and effectively.”), aff’d, 577 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1978); Clark v. S. Cent. 
Bell Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 702 (W.D. La. 1976) (noting that “if the class case has not been 
presented fully, it would be unfair and unconstitutional to bind absent parties”); Dolgow v. 
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (citing Hansberry for the proposition that the 
representation of a class “might be so poor that the judgment would not have any res judicata 
effect”), rev’d on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 47. Epstein, 126 F.3d at 1251. 
 48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 (1982).  The Restatement provides in 
relevant part: 
(1) A person is not bound by a judgment for or against a party who purports to represent 
him if: 
  . . . . 
(e) The representative failed to prosecute or defend the action with due diligence and 
reasonable prudence, and the opposing party was on notice of facts making that failure 
apparent. 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also id. cmt. f reporter’s note (“In class actions at least, the failure to 
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It should be obvious that adequate lawyering is essential to the full 
and fair consideration of class claims required by Hansberry.49  Indeed, 
the only plausible basis for the argument that performance defects cannot 
give rise to a constitutional problem is the assumption that adequate 
representation is simply about the legitimacy of a class proceeding ab 
initio.  But as I have argued above, adequate representation more 
accurately is about protecting the economic value of class claims. 
This understanding is consistent with the Court’s most recent 
decision on adequate representation, Taylor v. Sturgell.50  In Taylor, the 
Court faced the question of whether an individual suit by one plaintiff 
should be barred by an earlier suit involving the same facts brought by a 
later plaintiff who shared the interests of the first plaintiff.51  The 
plaintiffs knew each other and shared the same attorney.52  Yet the Court 
refused to bind the later plaintiff to the earlier judgment.53  The Court 
wrote: 
A party’s representation of a nonparty is “adequate” for preclusion 
purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of the nonparty and 
                                                                                                                       
advance a claim that has strong legal cogency may itself be regarded as a sufficient basis for refusing 
preclusion as to that issue.”); id. cmt. f illus. 11. (“A, a city taxpayer proceeding on behalf of himself 
and all others similarly situated, sues to restrain the city’s issuance of bonds.  The sole ground of A’s 
action is that applicable procedures for issuance of the bonds have not been complied with.  A 
dismissal of the action does not preclude a subsequent taxpayer’s action by B contending that the 
purpose for which the bonds are issued is unlawful, if that contention has such substantial merit that 
competent counsel would reasonably have asserted it in the first action.”). 
“The Restatement treats membership in the class as a prerequisite to serving as a class 
representative.”  Woolley, supra note 3, at 425 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 
(1982)).  But “[b]ecause the representative in a class suit necessarily prosecutes the action through 
counsel, it seems reasonable to treat section 42(1)(e) as reaching class counsel’s failure to prosecute 
the action with due diligence.”  Id.; see also supra note 20 (arguing that class representatives are 
essentially figureheads).  For an argument that the last clause of § 42(1)(e) makes subsection e 
weaker than required by the Constitution, see Woolley, supra note 3, at 422–28. 
 49. In fact, Professor Rubenstein has argued that the requirements of adequate representation in 
class litigation are best compared to the requirements of ineffective assistance of counsel in the Sixth 
Amendment context.  Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 857; see also Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 805–06 (2005) (recognizing that in 
some circumstances the adequacy analysis must focus on the representation provided by counsel and 
suggesting that the Sixth Amendment line of cases may be helpful); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., 
An Historical Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1855 (1998) 
(“If the interests of the class are presented with reasonable competence and vigor, then courts will be 
on safe ground in treating members of the class as bound even if they did not actually participate in 
the litigation.  This concept is also formulated in various ways, notably as whether the 
representatives ‘fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class’ or ‘prosecute or defend the 
action with due diligence and reasonable prudence.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
 50. 128 S. Ct. 2161 (2008). 
 51. Id. at 2167. 
 52. Id. at 2169. 
 53. Id. at 2178. 
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her representative are aligned, and (2) either the party understood 
herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court 
took care to protect the interests of the nonparty.  In addition, adequate 
representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the 
persons alleged to have been represented.54 
One might read the passage quoted above as comprehensively stating 
the requirements of adequate representation.  But it seems unlikely that 
the Court intended to suggest that the adequate representation 
requirement can be satisfied by incompetent counsel, for example.55  The 
question presented in Taylor was not whether counsel adequately 
represented the later plaintiff in the second suit, but whether the later 
plaintiff was represented at all in the first suit.56  As Hansberry noted, 
adequate representation is about ensuring the full and fair consideration 
of the common issue.57  That goal cannot be achieved if a party is 
represented by deficient counsel. 
But even if Taylor could be read to suggest that performance defects 
alone cannot give rise to inadequate representation, the case provides no 
support for the contention that only one kind of structural conflict may 
lead to inadequate representation.  Taylor speaks broadly of a 
requirement that “the interests of the nonparty and her representative [be] 
aligned”58 without providing any further detail.  Because most 
performance defects in the class context are inextricably intertwined with 
structural conflicts, Taylor is of limited significance even if read broadly 
to suggest that performance defects alone cannot give rise to inadequate 
representation. 
                                                     
 54. Id. at 2176 (citations omitted).  The Court in Taylor treats notice in this context as a 
requirement of adequate representation rather than as an independent requirement.  In so doing, the 
Court arguably misreads Richards and misconceives the relationship between adequate 
representation and notice.  For a different take on Richards and on the proper relationship between 
notice and adequate representation, see Woolley, supra note 18, at 573–74, 582–83. 
 55. See Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1286–87 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that satisfaction of the 
minimum requirements in Taylor does not resolve whether the representation afforded to absent 
class members satisfies the Due Process Clause). 
 56. No claim was made in Taylor that the lawyering in the first suit had been deficient.  The 
only issue before the Court was whether Taylor could be bound by a judgment in an earlier suit 
which neither the purported representative nor the court had understood to be representative.  Taylor, 
128 S. Ct. at 2167–70.  That is not to say that the performance of the plaintiff’s lawyer in the first 
suit was flawless.  At least in retrospect, he appears to have erred in failing to challenge on appeal 
certain assumptions underlying the District Court’s alternative holding in favor of the defendants.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the alternative holding, but refused to rule on whether the critical 
suppositions on which the alternative holding was premised were true.  Id. at 2168. 
 57. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940). 
 58. Taylor, 128 S. Ct. at 2165. 
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C. Structural Conflicts 
1. Aggregate Litigation’s Standard 
Aggregate Litigation—and Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda—err 
in assuming that the only relevant conflicts of interest from a 
constitutional perspective are those that create structural defects59—that 
is, conflicts that give rise to inadequate representation per se.60  Some 
structural conflicts—such as those between counsel and the class—are 
inevitable and cannot be considered structural defects per se.61  Yet, 
Aggregate Litigation—and Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda—would 
simply disregard such conflicts, unless at the outset of the litigation they 
“‘present a significant risk that lawyers for the claimants might skew 
systematically the conduct of the litigation.’”62  A “significant risk,” by 
definition, does not include the background risk inherent in any agency 
relationship.63  This narrow standard provides some protection against 
conflicts between class counsel and the class.  But, as I will demonstrate 
below, it fails to adequately protect an absent class member’s interest in 
the economic value of his or her claim.  For that reason, the impact of all 
structural conflicts on the class suit should be assessed before concluding 
that an absent class member has been adequately represented. 
                                                     
 59. I have drawn a distinction between “conflicts” and “defects” in my discussion because not 
every class conflict represents an impermissible defect in representation. 
 60. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1656–57 (distinguishing “structural conflicts of 
interest” from class counsel’s decision to “shirk responsibility by accepting an inadequate settlement 
so as to gain quickly at least some modicum of a fee award from the litigation”). 
 61. See State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 1013 (Vt. 2003) (“[W]e recognize that 
especially with respect to attorney’s fees, attorneys for the class in a damages action often have an 
unavoidable conflict of interest with the class that does not make their representation inadequate per 
se.”); Howard M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protections for the Class and the Case 
for Reform, 73 NEB. L. REV. 646, 657 (1994) (“Invariably direct conflicts arise between class 
counsel, the class, and its representatives with respect to attorneys’ fees, settlement, fee sharing, and 
other issues.”). 
 62. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d (“The objective . . . is for the court to 
determine whether conflicts of interest are such as ‘would present a significant risk that the lawyers 
for the claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation so as to favor some 
claimants over others on grounds aside from the reasoned evaluation of their respective claims or to 
disfavor claimants generally vis-à-vis the lawyers themselves.’”); id. (“[T]he judicial inquiry in 
subsection (a)(1) focuses on conflict . . . that is such as to present a significant risk that the conduct 
of the litigation will be skewed systematically—that is, in some direction predictable before the 
determination of related claims on an aggregate basis.”); see also Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra 
note 6, at 1684 (arguing that with respect to intra class conflicts, the differences “that matter are 
those that give rise to a significant potential for negotiation on behalf of an undifferentiated class to 
skew in some predictable way the design of class-settlement terms in favor of one or another 
subgroup for reasons unrelated to evaluation of the relevant claims”). 
 63. See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1699–1700 (discussing the difficulties in these 
agency relationships). 
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Aggregate Litigation’s focus on one particular kind of structural 
conflict—those “that would present a significant risk that the lawyers for 
claimants might skew systematically the conduct of the litigation”64—
purports to draw inspiration from Amchem and Ortiz.  In rejecting the 
settlement in those cases, the Court stressed the structural defects in the 
classes that made it difficult for one set of lawyers to protect the interests 
of all class members.65  The structural defects that the Court highlighted 
did in fact “present a significant risk” from the outset that conduct of the 
settlement negotiations would be “skew[ed] systematically” to “favor 
some claimants over others.”66  The Court accordingly concluded that the 
class should have been structured ab initio so as to avoid the conflicts of 
interest it identified: 
The class representatives may well have thought that the Settlement 
serves the aggregate interests of the entire class.  But the adversity 
among subgroups requires that the members of each subgroup cannot 
be bound to a settlement except by consents given by those who 
understand that their role is to represent solely the members of their 
respective subgroup.67 
Aggregate Litigation—and Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda—
also recognize that a conflict between class counsel and the class as a 
whole may sometimes constitute a “structural defect.”68  They cite as an 
                                                     
 64. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07(a)(1)(B). 
 65. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999) (stating that it is “essential” that 
“intraclass conflicts [be] addressed by recognizing independently represented subclasses”); Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 595 (1997) (finding that “the settling parties achieved a global 
compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation”). 
 66. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07(a)(1)(B). 
 67. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 627 (citing In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 982 F.2d 721, 
742–43 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993)).  As I have previously noted: 
[T]he requirement that easily identifiable categories of claimants be separately 
represented serves primarily to insure that, when practicable, each easily identified 
category of claimants will be represented by class counsel who does not have conflicting 
loyalties to other segments of the class.  The Court expressly recognized this fundamental 
point in Ortiz when it insisted on “separate representation to eliminate conflicting 
interests of counsel.” 
Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement, supra note 16, at 773 (quoting 
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856). 
 68. See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07(a)(1)(A) (stating that a class court must 
“determine that there are no structural conflicts of interest . . . between the named parties or other 
claimants and the lawyers who would represent claimants on an aggregate basis.”); see also 
Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1682–84.  Comment d to section 2.07 explains: 
Structural conflicts of interest might arise between named parties or other claimants and 
the lawyers who would represent claimants in the aggregate—for instance, when those 
lawyers also represent other persons whose claims would not be subject to aggregate 
treatment.  As part of its inquiry, the court should consider the alignment in the economic 
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example the conflict of interest in Ortiz between class counsel and the 
class.69  Counsel in that case represented both the class and other 
plaintiffs who were expressly excluded from the class definition.  As the 
Court in Ortiz described the problem: 
[S]ome of the same lawyers representing plaintiffs and the class had 
also negotiated the separate settlement of 45,000 pending claims, the 
full payment of which was contingent on a successful [resolution of 
Ortiz] . . . .  Class counsel thus had great incentive to reach any 
agreement in the global settlement negotiations that they thought might 
survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, rather than the best possible 
arrangement for the substantially unidentified global settlement class.70 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda recognize that the 
representation by the same counsel of plaintiffs who had pending claims 
and class members who had not yet brought suit “presented a significant 
potential for class counsel to skew the design of the class-settlement 
terms for reasons unrelated to considered evaluation of the relevant 
claims . . . .”71  They argue that a “differently structured class . . . that 
encompassed all pending cases [short of final judgment] would have 
eliminated the conflict . . . .”72  In other words, the conflicts “amounted 
to disabling conflicts because of the structure of the classes involved.”73 
2. The Scope of Amchem and Ortiz 
While Amchem and Ortiz require that the class be structured ab 
initio74 to protect the interests of absent class members, it is a mistake to 
read the cases as holding that only conflicts arising from the structure of 
a class can give rise to constitutional problems.  Indeed, Amchem and 
Ortiz purport to construe only the adequate representation requirement of 
                                                                                                                       
interests of claimants and their lawyers—for example, as reflected in the anticipated fee 
arrangement for representation in the aggregate proceeding. 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d (citation omitted). 
 69. Id. at § 2.07, cmt. d reporters’ note (explaining that Ortiz points to a conflict “between class 
counsel’s interest in settling the class action and class counsel’s interest in settling their ‘inventory’ 
cases”); Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1682–84 (citing both Amchem and Ortiz as 
involving unacceptable conflicts between class counsel and the class as a whole). 
 70. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 852 (citations omitted). 
 71. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1696.  Put simply, counsel had an incentive “to 
compromise the interests of future claimants in exchange for advantageous aggregate settlements for 
[plaintiffs] with cases pending” in the court system.  Id. 
 72. Id. at 1697. 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. at 1657–58. 
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Rule 23(a)(4)75—a provision that requires a proponent of class 
certification to demonstrate that the named plaintiffs will adequately 
represent the class.  In short, Rule 23(a)(4) requires a prediction that 
absent class members will be adequately represented.  And to be 
reasonably predictable, a structural conflict must “present a significant 
risk that the conduct of the litigation will be skewed systematically—that 
is in some direction predictable prior to the determination of related 
claims on an aggregate basis.”76  But Amchem and Ortiz do not speak to 
the meaning of adequate representation outside the limited context of 
Rule 23(a)(4). 
It can be argued that the prophylactic focus of Amchem and Ortiz is 
so indispensable as to be appropriately anchored in the Due Process 
Clause.77  But if proper attention is paid to the purpose of adequate 
representation—protecting the interests of individual class members in 
the economic value of their claims—there is no reason to suppose that 
the constitutional meaning of adequate representation can be limited to a 
prophylactic focus on structural conflicts.  Courts cannot realistically 
protect the interests of absent class members by focusing solely on the 
absence of “structural defects” as Aggregate Litigation narrowly defines 
that term.78  The self-interest of lawyers, for example, may lead them to 
neglect the interests of the class (or segments of the class) in important 
ways that are not always predictable prior to settlement.  This arguably is 
what happened in the Agent Orange litigation.79 
                                                     
 75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 2319–20; Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 625–26 (1997).  The Court in Amchem stated that Rule 23(a)(4) also “factors in competency 
and conflicts of class counsel.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 n.20. 
 76. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 77. Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement, supra note 16, at 773 n.58 
(2006) (“The prophylactic requirement that conflicting interests of ‘easily identifiable categories of 
claimants’ be separately represented provides a safeguard so fundamental that it should be deemed a 
constitutional requirement.”); Woolley, Choice of Law, supra note 16, at 819 n.66 (2004) 
(“Although [Amchem and Ortiz] focus exclusively on Rule 23 in their discussion of adequate 
representation, I agree with those who believe that the Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(a)(4) simply 
incorporates the requirements of the Due Process Clause with respect to adequate representation.”).  
Other commentators have also concluded that the adequate representation requirement set forth in 
Federal Rule 23 has constitutional stature.  See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 352 (“The Court 
[in Amchem and Ortiz] redefines due process to focus centrally on the faithfulness of the agent that 
has litigated on behalf of the absent class members, what Rule 23 terms the ‘adequacy of 
representation . . . .’”).  But see Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 809–10 (expressing skepticism that the 
Court’s interpretation of Rule 23(a)(4) has constitutional significance). 
 78. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 79. For a comprehensive discussion of the Agent Orange litigation through 1986, see PETER 
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986).  Others also have discussed the Agent Orange litigation 
in depth.  See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 3, at 1817–36.  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda argue 
that “[t]he difference that really mattered for due process purposes in Stephenson was precisely the 
one that the Second Circuit said did not: the same Amchem-like lumping together of both presently 
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3. The Agent Orange Litigation 
Class counsel in Agent Orange agreed to a binding settlement before 
development of a distribution plan80 and delegated development of a plan 
to the court.81  For our purposes, the distribution plan is controversial 
because it drew a line between veterans who were uninjured at the time 
of settlement, but would manifest injury in 1994 or earlier (entitled to 
monetary compensation), and veterans who would manifest injury after 
1994 (not entitled to monetary compensation).82  Because the obligation 
to adequately represent the class rests on class counsel, he cannot evade 
responsibility for an inadequate distribution plan by asking the court to 
craft and impose a plan on the parties.  Thus, the fact that class counsel 
did not draft or endorse the plan in Agent Orange should have no bearing 
on the argument that veterans who manifested injury after 1994 were 
inadequately represented.  Indeed, one could argue that class counsel’s 
delegation of responsibility to the court was driven by the desire to bring 
costly litigation to an end and get paid—in other words, neglect based on 
self-interest. 
In the absence of a sound substantive justification for drawing a 
distinction between class members, class counsel has an obligation to 
ensure, to the extent practicable, that all the class members he represents 
are compensated equally for the same injury.83  If exposure to Agent 
Orange was harmful, there was no reason at the time of the settlement to 
believe that injuries from exposure would not manifest themselves after 
1994.84  As the district judge himself recognized in the fairness opinion, 
                                                                                                                       
diseased and presently healthy veterans at the time of the class judgment.”  Issacharoff & Nagareda, 
supra note 6, at 1688.  I have no quarrel with the proposition that Stephenson might appropriately 
have been resolved on that ground.  I simply argue that the inadequacy of the representation in Agent 
Orange was not limited to the failure to separately represent veterans who were ill from those who 
were apparently healthy at the time of settlement. 
 80. As Professor Schuck notes, the 
notice of proposed settlement had not contained a distribution plan but had simply 
outlined the basic elements of the plan the PMC had indicated it would propose, which 
proposal [Judge] Weinstein subsequently rejected. And it was only in May 1985, more 
than four months after he had finally approved the settlement, that he issued the plan. 
SCHUCK, supra note 79, at 221. 
 81. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1399–1400 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 82. Id. at 1417–19. 
 83. For a discussion of the limits practicality imposes on adequate representation, see supra 
Part II.A, D–E. 
 84. I do not suggest that the claims of any of the class members in the Agent Orange litigation 
were strong at the time settlement was reached.  Quite apart from serious questions of causation, the 
manufacturers of Agent Orange had important defenses available, including the government 
contractor defense.  Indeed, after some plaintiffs successfully mounted a collateral attack on the 
judgment settling the claims, defendants obtained a dismissal premised on the government contractor 
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“[i]t took almost forty years for solid tissue cancer to develop in victims 
of the atomic bombing in Japan.”85  Thus, the representation in Agent 
Orange was inadequate because it permitted the disparate treatment of 
injured veterans without any substantive justification. 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda have argued that veterans who 
suffered injury after 1994 were not disadvantaged because every veteran 
who was uninjured at the time of settlement received the functional 
equivalent of an insurance policy covering injuries for the period 
prescribed by the settlement.86  From that perspective, veterans arguably 
received insurance policies of equal value.  I disagree that analogizing 
the settlement to an insurance policy is the appropriate way of valuing 
the settlement for the purpose of determining adequate representation.  
While it was not possible at the time of settlement to predict the benefit 
of the settlement to any particular class member, it was clear at the time 
of settlement that some veterans would receive no compensation simply 
because they would suffer injury after 1994.  Thus, it should be of little 
moment that those who would be denied compensation could not be 
identified at the time of settlement.87  Class counsel had an obligation to 
take the interests of those veterans into account; the insurance analogy in 
this context simply disregards those interests.88  As the Court in Ortiz 
noted, treating differently situated class members alike is itself an 
allocation decision.89 
                                                                                                                       
defense.  See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 89–92 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 85. In re “Agent Orange,” 597 F. Supp. 740, 795 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).  Cf. Issacharoff & 
Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1686 n.117 (“The lapse of time—the ten year cutoff came more than 
twenty years after the last alleged exposure to Agent Orange—made a causal connection 
increasingly implausible.”) (citation omitted). 
 86. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1686–87.  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda 
assume that the only question was how to appropriately allocate the $180 million fund set aside to 
compensate those who manifested injuries compensable under the settlement.  But as discussed 
below, class counsel arguably should have insisted on a larger fund.  See infra note 92. 
 87. Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda cite Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology & 
Telecommunications, Inc., 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002), to suggest that the fact that some class 
members would be paid more than others does not matter for purposes of adequate representation so 
long as the camp in which a particular class member would fall cannot be determined at the time of 
settlement.  Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1689.  In Uhl, the same class representative 
represented class members who would receive very different treatment under the settlement.  Uhl, 
309 F.3d at 985–86.  But unlike the settlement in Agent Orange, there were substantive legal 
differences between class members in Uhl that justified the disparate treatment.  Id. at 987.  I do not 
quarrel with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion—and that of Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda—
that separate representation of the differently situated class members in Uhl was unnecessary.  See 
id. at 985–86; Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1689–90. 
 88. David Dana has suggested a number of ways in which the settlement could have been 
drafted to more fairly protect the interests of those who would suffer injury after 1994.  See Dana, 
supra note 3, at 327. 
 89. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 857 (1999). 
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I recognize that the conclusion that class counsel neglected the 
interests of a part of the class out of self-interest is debatable.  Indeed, it 
should be obvious that neglect based on self-interest will often be hard to 
distinguish from neglect based on lack of diligence; in fact, self-interest 
may lead to a lack of diligence.90  But what matters for present purposes 
is that, while the neglect that I note does not fit within Aggregate 
Litigation’s definition of “structural defect,”91 the alleged cause of the 
neglect in Agent Orange clearly implicates class counsel’s duty of 
loyalty, a matter at the heart of any reasonable definition of adequate 
representation.  Indeed, it makes little sense to ignore the fact that a 
structural conflict—by any common-sense definition of the term—
inevitably exists between class counsel and the class.  The goal obviously 
cannot be to eliminate the inherent structural conflict between class 
counsel and the class, but neither should the consequences of the conflict 
in particular cases simply be immune from constitutional scrutiny. 
In noting that class counsel failed to represent the class with the care 
and diligence required, I certainly do not suggest that counsel in Agent 
Orange were incompetent or malicious.  But if—as I have argued—
counsel had a duty to protect veterans who would suffer injury after 
1994, counsel failed to discharge that duty with reasonable care and due 
diligence.92  It is likely that neither counsel nor Judge Weinstein 
understood counsel’s obligation to those who would manifest injury after 
1994.  But a mistaken understanding of the requirements of adequate 
representation cannot immunize the representation from attack if the 
adequate representation requirement is to achieve its objective. 
The Second Circuit applied a different analysis, attempting instead to 
shoehorn the case into the subclassing analysis set forth in Amchem and 
Ortiz.93  The Second Circuit suggested that veterans who manifested 
                                                     
 90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. f reporter’s note (“While collusion 
and inadequate diligence or vigor by a representative are logically distinct from conflict of interest 
on his part, as a practical matter the two will often coalesce.”); see also Catherine T. Struve, 
Commentary on Class Action Settlements Under Attack, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2146 (2008) 
(noting “the difficulty of drawing a bright line between performance defects and structural defects”). 
 91. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 92. I do not suggest that counsel’s failure to protect those who manifested injury after 1994 was 
the only way in which the representation provided by counsel may have fallen short of the 
requirements of adequate representation.  See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 79, at 161 (noting that class 
counsel was in a poor position to defend a settlement amount higher than $180 million because “the 
lawyers possessed little reliable information either about the number of class members who would 
actually claim against the settlement fund or about the nature of their specific injuries”).  But see id. 
(“In some ways, the . . . lack of information was understandable.”).  For discussion of the judge’s 
role in artificially limiting the size of the settlement fund, see infra notes 176–80 and accompanying 
text. 
 93. Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).  The Court concluded: 
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illness after 1994 received inadequate representation because they were 
not separately represented from those who manifested illness before 
1994.  Because subclasses are appropriately drawn before settlement, 
whether a class suit was properly structured cannot reasonably be 
determined on the basis of lines drawn by the settlement.94  But the 
Reporters of Aggregate Litigation are mistaken in thinking that, as long 
as class members adversely affected by the settlement cannot be 
identified in advance of settlement, the requirements of adequate 
representation have been served.95  That is too simplistic a view, 
privileging the prophylactic protections of Amchem and Ortiz over a core 
marker of adequate representation in the context of settlement—a 
settlement that appropriately takes into account the relative economic 
value of class members’ legal claims. 
4. The BancBoston Litigation 
Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp.96 even more clearly 
demonstrates the need for an adequacy standard that goes beyond the 
narrow definition championed by Aggregate Litigation and Professors 
Issacharoff and Nagareda.97  Class counsel in BancBoston had settled 
claims against defendants in an Alabama lawsuit alleging that defendants 
were requiring plaintiff mortgagors to maintain escrow accounts larger 
than authorized by the mortgage contracts.98  The settlement reduced the 
size of future escrow accounts, required a refund of some of the money 
                                                                                                                       
No provision was made for post-1994 claimants, and the settlement fund was permitted to 
terminate in 1994.  Amchem and Ortiz suggest that Stephenson and Isaacson were not 
adequately represented in the prior Agent Orange litigation.  Those cases indicate that a 
class which purports to represent both present and future claimants may encounter 
internal conflicts. 
Id. at 260–61. 
 94. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 6, at 319. 
 95. See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d reporters’ note (“disapproving” 
the Second Circuit’s argument that “the class due-process violation lay in the conflict between 
veterans who manifested disease before the cutoff for cash benefits specified by the class settlement 
and those who manifested disease thereafter—a distinction that did not exist at the time of class 
certification but, rather, was the creation of the class settlement itself”). 
 96. No. CV-91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 24, 1994).  Professor Koniak discusses the litigation at 
length.  See Koniak, supra note 3, at 1808–17; Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak 
of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1058–68 (1996). 
 97. See Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 6, at 340 (“The problem in the 
BancBoston litigation stems not from any misalignment of interest within the class but, instead, from 
the inherent misalignment of interest between the class and class counsel—here, class counsel’s 
willingness, as part of the class settlement agreement, to embrace a fee calculus that disserved the 
interests of the class.”). 
 98. State v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 826 A.2d 997, 999 (Vt. 2003). 
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held in escrow accounts, and mandated the payment of interest on 
amounts held in escrow without authorization.99  The interest due under 
the settlement amounted to less than nine dollars on average for existing 
mortgagors.100  Class counsel then sought (and obtained) attorneys’ fees 
that were out of proportion to the benefit conferred on the class.  In 
refusing to give effect to the Alabama judgment, the Vermont Supreme 
Court quoted the perceptive analysis of Professors Koniak and Cohen: 
Class counsel asked for attorney’s fees equaling 33 1/3% of all the 
money the bank was wrongfully holding in escrow; that is, one-third of 
all the excessive cushion money . . . .  Had there been no lawsuit, 100% 
of the excess cushion would have been returned to class members at the 
time their mortgages were repaid.  Therefore, what the lawsuit 
recovered for each class member was (in addition to the back interest) 
only the difference between the value of the excess cushion money in 
the class member’s hands today and the value of the money had the 
bank held it until the mortgage was paid off . . . .  All that the class 
members had lost by the bank’s allegedly wrongful acts was the use of 
that money today and the use of that money in years past.101 
As a result of the formula used to calculate the attorneys’ fees, many 
mortgagors lost money as a result of the settlement.102  The most widely 
known example is that of a class member who recovered $2.19 in 
interest, but paid an attorneys’ fee of $91!103  Professors Koniak and 
Cohen note that “[a]ny class member who paid more in attorney’s fees 
than he or she recovered ‘would have been better off if class counsel had 
lost the case.’”104 
Yet whether class counsel in Alabama acted out of incompetence (a 
performance defect) or unacceptable greed (the manifestation of a 
structural conflict), Aggregate Litigation—and Professors Issacharoff 
and Nagareda—would apparently conclude that the representation in this 
case (and in Agent Orange) cannot be deemed constitutionally 
inadequate, no matter how problematic class counsel’s conduct.105  That 
                                                     
 99. Id. at 1000. 
 100. Id. at 1001–02. 
 101. Id. at 1002–03 (citing Koniak & Cohen, supra note 96, at 1063). 
 102. Koniak & Cohen, supra note 96, at 1063. 
 103. Id. at 1067; see also Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003 (noting the allegations in the 
complaint (1) that the settlement was of no benefit to residents of Vermont because Vermont law 
requires that interest be paid on escrow accounts at the prevailing savings account rate and (2) that 
residents of Vermont were required to pay at least $30,000 in attorneys’ fees). 
 104. Homeside Lending, 826 A.2d at 1003 (quoting Koniak & Cohen, supra note 96, at 1068). 
 105. Remarkably, Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda in part appeal to “intuition” to support 
this conclusion.  See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1700 (“There is an intuitive 
difference, in short, between the existence of legitimate authority to act upon class members on an 
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is because the defects in representation manifested in BancBoston and 
Agent Orange had nothing to do with the “structure of the classes 
involved,”106 but rather with counsel’s performance. 
5. The Epstein Litigation 
It is less clear whether the representation in Epstein v. MCA, Inc.,107 
the landmark case rejecting collateral attack, satisfies the constitutional 
standard for adequacy endorsed by Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda.  
In that case, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a class member absent 
from a Delaware class action could collaterally attack the Delaware 
judgment in a separate federal class action in California.108  The federal 
action was pending at the time the Delaware state court rendered 
judgment approving the settlement of (1) state-law claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty and (2) federal securities claims.109  The state court had no 
subject-matter jurisdiction over the federal securities claims, and the 
state-law claims were so weak that Judge Norris noted that “it would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the Delaware plaintiffs were kept in state 
court entirely at the sufferance of [defendants].”110  Defendants simply 
used the state-court action as a way of settling the far stronger federal 
claims cheaply, knowing that “class counsel had an extraordinary 
incentive to settle and settle quickly” before judgment could be rendered 
in the securities class action in federal district court “because that was the 
only way they could extract a fee out of the federal claims.”111 
                                                                                                                       
aggregate basis and the proper exercise of that authority in the settlement at hand.”). 
 106. Id. at 1697 (emphasis added). 
 107. 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).  For a useful 
discussion of the Epstein litigation, see Koniak, supra note 3, at 1808–17. 
 108. Epstein, 126 F.3d at 1242. 
 109. Id. at 1235. 
 110. Id. at 1249 n.13.  “[T]he Delaware Vice Chancellor, in rejecting the first settlement, 
determined that the state law claims were ‘extremely weak’ and had ‘little or no value’ because no 
such state cause of action existed.”  Id. (citing In re MCA Shareholders Litigation, 598 A.2d 687, 
694 (Del. Ch. 1991)).  Delaware class counsel did not even conduct discovery on the federal claims 
and may not have been able to do so “because the facts relevant to those claims had no apparent 
relevance to the subject matter of the state law claim that the MCA directors had breached their 
fiduciary duties in failing to maximize shareholder value upon a change of corporate control.”  Id. at 
1249. 
 111. Id. at 1250.  As Judge Norris explained: 
Class counsel could not benefit from the federal claims by going to trial for the obvious 
reason that the federal claims could not be litigated in state court.  Moreover, the 
pendency of a parallel action in federal court—the Epstein case—meant that Delaware 
class counsel were at risk of being “beaten to the punch” and getting no return on the 
federal claims at all.  Matsushita knew that it was negotiating a release of the federal 
claims with class counsel who could not litigate those claims and whose self-interest gave 
 
0.6.0_WOOLLEY FINAL 5/10/2010  12:45:58 PM 
2010] COLLATERAL ATTACK 941 
The “jarring misalignment”112 of interests between class counsel and 
members of the class led to a classic example of “shirking,”113 a type of 
misconduct Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda insist is exempt from 
constitutional scrutiny.114  Both Aggregate Litigation and Professors 
Issacharoff and Nagareda emphasize structural defects that result from 
conflicts between segments of the class or between the class and others 
represented by class counsel.115  No such conflicts exist in Epstein. 
On the other hand, the literal wording of the abstract standard set 
forth in Section 2.07(a)(1)(A) of Aggregate Litigation is sufficiently 
broad to justify the conclusion that the representation in Epstein was 
inadequate.  Aggregate Litigation expressly forbids “structural conflicts 
of interest between the named parties or other claimants and the lawyers 
who would represent claimants on an aggregate basis.”116  Because 
Delaware had no subject-matter jurisdiction to try the federal claims, 
                                                                                                                       
them an incentive to settle and settle fast. 
  What all this demonstrates is that there was a jarring misalignment of interests 
between class counsel and members of the federal class.  It was plainly in the best interest 
of counsel to settle the federal claims at any price.  For them, any settlement was better 
than no settlement because settlement was the only way they could make any money on 
the federal claims—indeed, given that the state claims were essentially worthless, it was 
the only way that Delaware counsel could get any compensation at all. 
Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Cf. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1657 (distinguishing “structural conflict[s] of 
interest” from class counsel’s decision to “shirk responsibility by accepting an inadequate settlement 
so as to gain quickly at least some modicum of a fee award from the litigation”).  The defects at 
issue in Epstein involved not the structure of the class, but counsel’s self-interested decision to settle 
the federal claims cheaply.  Judge Norris noted a particularly egregious illustration of the lengths to 
which class counsel were willing to go in shirking their responsibilities: 
The inadequacy of Delaware counsel’s representation is brought into sharp focus by their 
vigorous disparagement of the federal claims throughout the course of the settlement 
proceedings. . . .  Counsel consistently sought to convince, not only their clients, but their 
adversaries and the Chancery Court itself that the federal claims had no merit.  They 
repeatedly and summarily dismissed those claims as “frivolous” without ever conducting 
any discovery or any meaningful analysis of the legal issues, much less presenting the 
claims in a favorable light. 
Epstein, 126 F.3d at 1251.  Even Judge O’Scannlain—who argued against collateral attack—agreed 
that the representation in question was problematic: “[Counsel’s] act of referring, in a single breath, 
to their own clients’ claims as ‘fraught with uncertainty,’ ‘weak,’ and ‘horrendous’ suggests less 
than dynamic advocacy.”  Id. at 1256 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 114. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1699–1700 (arguing that shirking by class counsel 
does not render the representation constitutionally inadequate).  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda 
note: “The defendant in a reverse-auction scenario plays on this residual risk of shirking by parking a 
desired class settlement with class counsel most inclined to shirk in exchange for at least some 
measure of a fee award.”  Id. at 1699.  This appears to describe what defendants did in the Epstein 
litigation. 
 115. Id. at 1677–98; see also AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07 cmt. d. 
 116. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 2.07(a)(1)(A). 
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Delaware class counsel was disabled from trying the federal securities 
claims.117  On that basis, it could be argued that any effort by counsel to 
settle those claims would be infected by a structural conflict under 
section 2.07(a)(1)(A). 
Professor Issacharoff has argued that in addressing a different issue 
the Court treated “far too lightly the potential consequences of a 
settlement in which . . . the lawyers [had] no claim to speak as 
authoritative agents for the class.”118  But remarkably, both Aggregate 
Litigation and Class Settlements Under Attack are silent on whether the 
representation in Epstein would pass constitutional muster under the 
standard they endorse.  In any event, it should make little difference from 
a constitutional standpoint whether or not the problem in Epstein can be 
shoehorned into the narrow confines of section 2.07(a)(1)(A).  As the 
Ninth Circuit recognized, the defects in representation in Epstein clearly 
implicate class counsel’s duty of loyalty, a matter at the heart of any 
reasonable understanding of the constitutional requirements of adequate 
representation.119 
* * * * 
In short, Aggregate Litigation’s attempt to circumscribe the 
constitutional meaning of adequate representation to a narrowly defined 
set of structural conflicts ignores the rationale of the adequate-
representation requirement in favor of a framework apparently crafted to 
make finality substantially easier to achieve.  I agree that finality is 
precious, but it should not be purchased at the price of eviscerating the 
adequate-representation requirement. 
D. The Subclassing Requirement 
In the Subparts above, I demonstrated that the meaning of adequate 
representation cannot be limited to structural defects as that term is 
                                                     
 117. Cf. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1697 (stating that a class suit that does not 
encompass all of the claimants may create a disabling conflict “because of the structure of the 
classes involved”). 
 118. Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 389 (criticizing Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Epstein, 516 
U.S. 367 (1996)).  The Court in Matsushita held that the judgment at issue in Epstein could not be 
denied full faith and credit simply because the Delaware courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the federal claims.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit decisions discussed in the text were rendered on 
remand. 
 119. See Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235, 1250–51 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated on other 
grounds, 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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narrowly defined by Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda.  In this 
section, I explain how courts should determine whether subclassing is an 
appropriate remedy for any given structural conflict within the class. 
Amchem and Ortiz require that absent class members with conflicting 
interests be separately represented through the use of subclasses.  Of 
course, taken to its logical extreme, subclassing would render use of the 
class device simply impracticable.120  But there is no reason to believe 
that the Court intended to require subclassing beyond the bounds of 
practicality.  The Court’s focus in Ortiz was on subclassing with respect 
to “easily identifiable categories of claimants,”121 and it acknowledged 
that “at some point there must be an end to reclassification with separate 
counsel.”122  Put simply, Amchem and Ortiz are best read as creating a 
rebuttable presumption that easily identifiable categories of claimants 
should be separately represented by counsel. 
The key to appropriately applying the subclassing requirement of 
Amchem and Ortiz is to recognize that, in class suits seeking money 
damages, the interests of an absent class member are best served by 
maximizing his or her recovery.  Thus, a district court should not require 
separate representation of a category of claimants if the cost of separate 
representation will outweigh the potential benefits to those claimants.123  
It will often be wasteful to require separate representation of all 
identifiable categories of claimants in negative-value suits, for example.  
As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in one such suit: 
[I]n light of the modesty of stakes even of class members who had 
multiple refund anticipation loans and the expense of subdividing the 
class (and how many subdivisions would be necessary to reflect the full 
range of damages?), we are not disposed to regard this particular defect 
in the settlement as fatal.124 
                                                     
 120. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 396 (2000) (noting that excessive subclassing 
“call[s] into question the viability of the class action as an efficient organizational form”); 
Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 380 (noting that a reading of Amchem that would forbid any allocative 
decisions by plaintiffs’ counsel would require “a spiral of subclasses and sets of counsel that would 
not only swamp the incentive to invest in bringing a class action, but would impose tremendous 
transactional costs on an already vulnerable procedure that turned heavily on its ability to realize 
economies of scale”). 
 121. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831–32 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 122. Id. at 857. 
 123. In calculating the “cost” of representation, the court must include compensation sufficient 
to persuade skilled counsel to invest appropriate time and resources in the litigation. 
 124. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 282 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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And even in high-value suits, at some point in the subdivision of the 
class, the potential expense of providing separate representation will not 
be commensurate with the potential benefit to those separately 
represented.125  In short, in deciding whether a particular category of 
claimants should be afforded separate representation, a court must 
consider whether the conflict of interest is of such magnitude as to lead 
to the conclusion that a category of claimants would benefit from 
separate representation. 
The use of subclassing may also be impracticable from the 
standpoint of managing the class suit as a whole.  In such a case, 
adequate representation will not require further subclassing if it is in the 
interest of all class members to proceed in a single suit.  In other cases, 
for at least some class members, the benefits of being part of the class 
suit will not outweigh the costs resulting from a lack of separate 
representation.  The court in such a case ordinarily should order that the 
claims of such class members be severed from the larger class suit. 
Because the requirement of separate representation for divergent 
interests must be limited by practical considerations, there may well be 
conflicts of interest within a subclass.126  While the zeal with which class 
counsel represents any individual member must be tempered by 
counsel’s responsibility to the subclass as a whole, each class member in 
the subclass has the right to expect that class counsel will competently 
endeavor to treat the class member’s claims equitably vis-à-vis the 
claims of others that counsel represents. 
In a recent article, Jay Tidmarsh has argued that adequate 
representation, properly understood, does not require subclassing at 
all127—that an individual has been adequately represented in a class suit 
provided that he or she would be no worse off proceeding in a class suit 
than he or she would have been in individual litigation.128  There is much 
                                                     
 125. Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in 
Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1497 (1998) (“[I]n the real world, members of 
litigation groups often view conflict-related risks as a price they are willing to pay to obtain large 
and certain economic benefits, including economies of scale and the strategic advantage of 
presenting a united front.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 126. See id. at 1496 (“If the Due Process Clause absolutely prohibits counsel for a group from 
resolving conflicts among claimants, each class member must be separately represented on the 
matter of settlement allocation.”); Issacharoff, supra note 20, at 385 (noting that “[s]ome allocation 
decisions are inescapable because there is an inevitable rough-hewn quality to the relief provided by 
class actions”). 
 127. Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2009).  
Professor Tidmarsh finds subclassing “wanting” as a technique to address conflicts within the class.  
Id. at 1199 n.262; see also id. at 1162–64. 
 128. Id. at 1139 (“Representation by class representatives and counsel is adequate if, and only if, 
the representation makes class members no worse off than they would have been if they had engaged 
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to be said for Professor Tidmarsh’s approach, which he calls the “‘do no 
harm’ principle.”129  His focus on the bottom line for the individual after 
fees and costs tracks with my argument that adequate representation in 
class suits for money damages is essentially about safeguarding the 
economic value of individual claims.  He also recognizes that the cost of 
litigation must be factored into any assessment of adequate 
representation.130 
Our views differ in two noteworthy respects.  First, while I agree that 
the settlement value of a case (and the claims therein) must be considered 
in analyzing adequacy,131 I am skeptical of the view that adequate 
representation can be reduced to settlement value.  As Donald Puckett 
has observed: 
The extent and value of the plaintiffs’ injuries are likely to be the 
subject of intense factual dispute, with estimates possibly differing by 
thousands or millions of dollars.  The likelihood of success on the 
merits is also likely to be disputed on both factual and legal grounds, 
with difficult issues of duty and causation or contract interpretation and 
the like complicating any inquiry into the plaintiffs’ chances of winning 
or losing.  Perhaps the additional legal expenses are slightly more 
capable of calculation, but uncertainties regarding the extent of 
preparation necessary and the duration of litigation also make this 
variable less than precise.132 
                                                                                                                       
in individual litigation.”).  But see id. at n.16 (noting that the formulation is too simplistic with 
respect to negative-value suits).  Professor Tidmarsh puts his understanding of the adequate 
representation requirement in the following mathematical form: (PI * LI) – (FI  + CI) < (PC * LC) – 
(FC  + CC)).  Id. at 1177. 
PI . . . represent[s] that probability of a class member’s recovery in individual litigation, 
LI the size of the recovery in individual litigation, FI the attorneys fees in individual 
litigation, and CI the costs of individual litigation.  And let PC represent that probability 
of a class member’s recovery in class litigation, LC the size of the recovery in class 
litigation, FC the member’s pro rata share of attorneys fees in class litigation, and CC the 
member’s pro rata share of costs in class litigation. 
Id. at 1176–77.  For a full description of the proposal, see id. at 1176–80. 
 129. Id. at 1177. 
 130. Supra note 128 (particularly variable CI). 
 131. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 285 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing that “[a] high degree of precision cannot be expected in valuing a litigation, especially 
regarding the estimation of the probability of particular outcomes,” but insisting that “much more 
could have been done here without (what is obviously to be avoided) turning the fairness hearing 
into a trial of the merits”); see also Dana, supra note 3, at 281 (“[A]lthough the adequacy of 
representation inquiry certainly entails an examination into the presettlement structure of 
representation and the content of the proceedings, the inquiry also has, or at least should have, 
something to do with ex post substantive outcomes—about what the settlement actually delivers in 
the way of relief to individual class members.”). 
 132. G. Donald Puckett, Peering into a Black Box: Discovery and Adequate Attorney 
Representation for Class Action Settlements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1271, 1280 (1999) (noting that “each 
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Professor Tidmarsh avoids many of the difficulties of calculation by 
defining adequate representation to mean that a class member must be no 
worse off in the class than he or she would be in individual litigation, a 
standard that may necessitate only the roughest ballpark estimates.133  
But as I note immediately below, I do not think the definition he suggests 
is sufficiently protective of the claims of class members.  Because of the 
difficulty of accurately gauging settlement value, I doubt that the 
constitutional right to adequate representation can be properly 
safeguarded by focusing solely on the value of the settlement. 
Second, I believe adequate representation requires an effort by 
counsel and the class court to distribute settlement proceeds (less 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs) in accordance with the relative 
strength of class members’ claims, unless—and only to the extent that—
providing a greater level of precision would not be worth the cost of 
doing so.  By contrast, the disposition of settlement proceeds under 
Professor Tidmarsh’s model is irrelevant, provided each class member is 
no worse off than he or she would be in individual litigation.134  In short, 
rather than requiring an equitable distribution of settlement proceeds, 
Professor Tidmarsh would leave distribution of any surplus created by 
the class device free from constitutional constraints.135  In my view, that 
wide discretion—while administratively appealing136—does not 
                                                                                                                       
of the variables” used to calculate settlement value “is incapable of precise measurement” and 
arguing that “[a] judicial assessment of settlement value fails to identify unfair settlements”); see 
also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lecture, The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1257, 1266 (1995) 
(“[T]he objective value of a settlement is indicative of unfairness in a settlement only in 
outrageously bad settlements.”).  The difficulty of precisely calculating settlement value does not 
mean that settlement value should be ignored altogether in determining adequacy. 
 133. See Tidmarsh, supra note 127, at 1189 (conceding “that precise measurements under the 
‘do no harm’ formula are difficult to make,” but arguing that “it is unlikely that such detailed 
calculations will be necessary”). 
 134. See id. at 1191 (“Because the remaining class members are no worse off than they would 
have been with individual control . . . , the representation in this case is, under the ‘do no harm’ 
principle, adequate.”). 
 135. Id. (noting that the “do-no-harm” principle “is a minimal principle, rather than a maximal 
version of adequacy that requires the gains from class treatment to be distributed among claimants in 
proportion to the strength and extent of their claims . . . .”).  Professor Tidmarsh nonetheless argues 
that “[r]eal-world dynamics temper the inequities inherent in the ‘do no harm’ principle and push the 
parties toward the ‘equal gains for equal claims’ principle without incurring the added costs of 
adopting the latter principle across the board.”  Id. at 1192. 
 136. Professor Tidmarsh notes: 
  Despite its surface appeal, one problem with an “equal gains for equal claims” 
principle is the difficulty of applying it in many class actions.  When class members 
present an array of temporally and geographically dispersed claims and injuries, an 
“equal gains for equal claims” principle requires the collection of a great deal of 
information, as well as difficult judgments about which claims, claimants, and 
distributions are in fact “equal.”  Such a principle would therefore eat deeply into—and 
perhaps surpass—the gains in reduced litigation costs and avoidance of harms that are the 
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sufficiently respect the property interests of individual class members.  
The property right at issue is not a right to individual litigation, but to the 
remedy afforded by law.  The cost of litigation must be included when 
calculating the economic value of a claim.  But focusing on the cost of 
individual litigation when claims are being litigated through the class 
device does not give sufficient weight to the remedy provided by law. 
Subclassing is an important tool if adequate representation requires 
that the relative strength of class member claims be taken into account in 
dividing up settlement proceeds.  Counsel for a subclass will have an 
incentive to unearth evidence and make arguments that would support a 
higher valuation for the claims of class members he represents vis-à-vis 
the claims of other class members.  In other words, subclassing may 
provide a net benefit to a subclass that would outweigh the costs of 
separate representation.  Given the high cost of separate representation, 
subclasses should be used sparingly, but should be used when 
appropriate. 
E. The Nature of Adequacy Review 
A reviewing court—on direct or collateral review—should keep in 
mind that class counsel and the class court often make difficult judgment 
calls.  To reject a reasonable judgment by the class court or class counsel 
simply because a reviewing court would have made a different judgment 
would fail to give finality its due.  For that reason, so long as the class 
court has applied the appropriate legal criteria, its decisions with respect 
to subclasses should withstand review, unless the court acted 
unreasonably or there is an appropriate basis for challenging the record 
on which the decision was made.  Similarly, class counsel should not be 
found to have provided inadequate representation unless a reasonable 
lawyer—with a proper understanding of his legal obligations to the 
class—would have acted differently.137 
                                                                                                                       
raison d’être of Rule 23. 
Id. (citation omitted).  I agree that the “equal gains for equal claims” principle may have to give way 
for practical reasons, but only on a case-by-case basis. 
 137. See Woolley, Choice of Law, supra note 16, at 827–28 (calling for a “reasonable lawyer” 
standard of adequacy and noting that “[b]ecause assessment of litigation risks and tradeoffs is not an 
exact science, a reasonable lawyer standard would give class counsel significant discretion”).  
Professor Rubenstein has argued that on collateral attack, counsel’s performance must have 
“prejudiced” absent class members.  Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 863.  To the extent a collateral 
attack is premised on class counsel’s performance, prejudice may be an appropriate part of the 
inquiry.  I do not address that issue in this Article. 
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Appellate courts have long applied an abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing whether representation of the class has been adequate.138  
Review on collateral attack, by contrast, should be de novo.139  If the 
class court lacked the power to require the absent class member to 
appear, the absentee cannot properly be bound by the record developed 
in the class court.140  I do not mean that on collateral review an absent 
class member may introduce any admissible evidence that in hindsight 
tends to show that the class member was inadequately represented.  
Because the question is whether the absentee received adequate 
representation at the time of the original lawsuit,141 the only information 
going to the strength of class claims that is relevant on collateral review 
is that which could have been uncovered with reasonable diligence on 
the part of the class court and class counsel.  If there is no basis for 
supplementing the record with additional information, the task of a court 
                                                     
 138. See Woolley, supra note 3, at 436 & n.235 (collecting authority and noting that “the weight 
of precedent indicates that courts of appeal should apply an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard”).  I 
nonetheless believe that whether class counsel acted reasonably should be assessed de novo on direct 
review.  See note 137 and accompanying text.  A court on direct review applying a de novo standard 
remains bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact.  Woolley, supra note 3, at 437. 
 139. See id. at 436 & n.234 (collecting authority).  Professor Rubenstein has noted that none of 
the cases I cite “actually say that this is the governing standard—they just use it.” Rubenstein, supra 
note 1, at 814 n.95. 
 140. As Professor Koniak has  recognized: 
The court in which the challenge is brought must review adequacy de novo to avoid 
binding the challenger to any part of a judgment (or settlement) until that court 
determines that the first court had the power to affect the rights of the challenger.  Any 
lesser standard of review would be incoherent. 
Koniak, supra note 3, at 1836–37. 
 141. As Professor Rubenstein notes: 
F2 might inquire whether, knowing what we knew at the moment of settlement, was F1 
correct that the class was adequately represented?  But of course, F2 is tempted to ask 
something quite different.  Since time has passed—fifteen years in Stephenson—F2 is 
enticed to pose the question, knowing what we know now, was the class adequately 
represented?  When F2 asks this question, it is not truly revisiting the wisdom of F1’s 
adequacy determination.  It is remaking that decision in light of subsequent developments 
and/or changed circumstances. 
Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 813.  F1 and F2, of course, are terms used in preclusion law to refer 
respectively to (1) the forum which renders the original judgment and (2) the forum which 
determines the preclusive effect of the judgment rendered in F1. 
 I recognize that even if the inquiry is properly framed, the risk of hindsight bias highlighted by 
Professor Rubenstein remains.  See id. at 839 (arguing that the collateral court has a “tendency to fall 
victim to ‘hindsight bias’”).  “Hindsight bias ‘occurs when a person who knows how a risk actually 
played out is asked to “go back in time” and estimate the ex ante likelihood that the observed 
outcome would occur.’”  Id. at n.183 (quoting Charles M. Silver, Dissent from Recommendation to 
Set Fees Ex Post, 25 REV. LITIG. 497, 498 n.3 (2006)).  The risk of hindsight bias should be minimal 
in cases in which the statute of limitations on the underlying claims runs within a few years of the 
class judgment.  In any event, while the concerns raised by Professor Rubenstein are real, those 
concerns cannot be allowed to trump constitutional rights. 
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on collateral review should be the same as on direct review.142  But if 
new information is presented on collateral review, the task of the court is 
different.  The court must ask whether a finding of adequate 
representation is appropriate on the enhanced record. 
III. COLLATERAL ATTACK 
In the previous part, I explained why the cramped understanding of 
the constitutional demands of adequate representation proffered by the 
Reporters is wrong and offered a model that attempts to reconcile the 
demands of fairness to absent class members with the need for finality.  
In this part, I address whether a proper understanding of governing 
procedural principles permits the sort of limits on collateral attack that 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda call for in their scholarly work and 
in Aggregate Litigation.143  Specifically, Professors Issacharoff and 
Nagareda argue that (1) collateral attacks should address only structural 
defects, (2) collateral attacks should be unavailing so long as the court 
rendering the judgment has ruled on the structural defect in question, and 
(3) personal-jurisdiction requirements pose no obstacle to limiting 
collateral attacks.  There is no basis for limiting collateral attacks to 
structural defects; as argued above, structural defects and performance 
defects are equally serious from a constitutional perspective.144  I address 
below the remaining two arguments for limiting collateral attack and 
conclude that they have no sound basis in law. 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda would frame the debate over 
collateral attacks “as part of an unresolved conflict between the 
individualist premise of our inherited tradition of civil litigation and the 
reality of circumscribed litigant autonomy in aggregate litigation, most 
notably class actions.”145  But the frame they select is inexact at best.  
The debate over collateral attack is more properly framed as whether 
individuals are to be permitted to insist on enforcement of the very 
guarantee that justifies circumscribing litigant autonomy in the first 
place. 
                                                     
 142. See supra notes 137–39 and the accompanying text (discussing standards of review). 
 143. The Reporters insist that other remedies for inadequate representation may be available, 
including actions for malpractice.  AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.14; see also Issacharoff & 
Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1712.  I have previously explained why malpractice actions are not a 
constitutionally acceptable substitute for collateral attacks.  See Woolley, supra note 3, at 428–32. 
 144. Supra Parts II.A–C. 
 145. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1654. 
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A. The Nature of a Collateral Attack on a Class Judgment 
As a general rule, a party is bound by a judgment unless that 
judgment is reversed on direct appeal.  A plaintiff cannot bring a new 
suit on the same claim in a different court because he or she is unhappy 
with the judgment, and a defendant cannot argue that the judgment was 
wrong if suit is brought to enforce the judgment.  So provides the law of 
res judicata.  There can be no doubt that the principles of res judicata 
similarly bar relitigation by an absent class member who was adequately 
represented and who waived any right to “be heard and participate in the 
litigation.”146 
But while direct appeal ordinarily is the only avenue available to 
review a judgment, the law has long recognized that a collateral attack on 
a judgment may be appropriate in limited circumstances.147  For example, 
when a defendant in ordinary litigation fails to appear in court and that 
court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the law is clear that 
the defendant can defend against enforcement of a default judgment on 
the ground that the F1 court lacked personal jurisdiction.148  The 
availability of collateral attack in these circumstances remains 
unquestioned even though courts of appeal have held that the F1 court 
has an obligation to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant.149  The law traditionally has also recognized the right of 
an absent class member to collaterally attack a judgment for inadequate 
representation.150 
                                                     
 146. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). 
 147. What distinguishes a direct attack from a collateral attack is that a direct attack involves an 
appeal of the judgment while a collateral attack challenges the res judicata effect of the judgment, 
typically through a separate suit.  Because motions for relief from a void judgment raise virtually the 
same issues as more clear-cut examples of collateral attack, I treat such motions as collateral attacks.  
See Woolley, supra note 3, at 389 n.17.  I have argued that the class judge should be disqualified 
from hearing a motion for relief from judgment based on inadequate representation.  Id. at 434 n.225 
(“Because a finding of inadequate representation after completion of the class proceedings may 
reflect on the class judge (who had an obligation to monitor the adequacy of the representation 
throughout the proceeds), that judge should not hear the motion for relief.”). 
 148. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 
706 (1982) (“A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, 
and then challenge the judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceeding.”); see also 
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 332 (4th ed. 2004).  By contrast, if the defendant 
appears, any judicial findings with respect to personal jurisdiction are entitled to preclusive effect 
and the defense is waived if not raised.  Id. 
 149. See, e.g., System Pipe & Supply Co. v. M/V Victor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 325 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (agreeing with the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that “when entry of default is sought against a 
party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend, the district court has an affirmative duty to look 
into its jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties”). 
 150. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
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A collateral attack on a class judgment typically occurs when a 
plaintiff—an absentee in the earlier class suit151—brings a subsequent 
suit on a claim within the alleged scope of the class judgment.152  The 
defendant, of course, may defend by pleading preclusion.  The plaintiff, 
for her part, may seek to overcome the preclusion defense by arguing 
that she was inadequately represented.  In short, a collateral attack on a 
class judgment for inadequate representation, as a conceptual matter, is 
ordinarily an affirmative defense to the affirmative defense of 
preclusion.153  The plaintiff has a right to litigate the adequacy issue on 
its merits unless (1) the plaintiff through issue preclusion is bound by the 
finding of the rendering court that he or she was adequately represented, 
or (2) the plaintiff by his or her absence in the class proceeding waived 
his or her adequacy objections. 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda claim that some courts have 
invoked claim preclusion as a basis for refusing to permit an absent class 
member to litigate the adequacy of representation in a second suit: 
Some judges urge the application of claim preclusion principles, asking 
whether the collateral attack plaintiff had a “full and fair opportunity” 
to raise the alleged constitutional defect in the class-settlement court.  
Others point to issue preclusion principles, asking whether the asserted 
defect was actually litigated in and determined by the rendering court.  
                                                     
 151. There is general agreement that a class member who appeared in the class suit cannot 
collaterally attack the judgment for inadequate representation.  See Woolley, supra note 3, at 389 (“It 
is generally accepted . . . that a class member who litigates the adequacy issue in the class suit itself 
is bound by the court’s findings on the issue.”).  But see Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 868 (arguing 
that collateral attacks should be limited to class members who appeared and protested adequacy in 
the class suit itself unless they can demonstrate lack of notice or insufficient contacts); Kahan & 
Silberman, The Inadequate Search, supra note 5, at 788 (arguing that a “limited form of collateral 
attack should be available even to those plaintiffs who objected to the adequacy of representation in 
the first proceeding and were unsuccessful”). 
 152. Aggregate Litigation states that motions for relief from a class judgment are proper under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but insists that inadequate representation is not a basis for 
relief under Rule 60.  AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 3.14 cmt. a (“This section does not 
approve of postjudgment challenge as a vehicle for relitigating findings of adequacy of 
representation that were made prior to judgment by the court approving the settlement.”). 
 153. There are other contexts in which a plaintiff may assert an affirmative defense to a 
defendant’s affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Employer’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Collins & Aikman 
Floorcoverings, Inc., 422 F.3d 776, 779 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that the statute of limitations under 
Iowa law may be tolled if the plaintiff proves fraudulent concealment); see also Traylor v. Black, 
Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F.2d 213, 217 (8th Cir. 1951) (recognizing that “no reply is necessary in 
order for the trial court—and this court on appeal—to consider, in like manner and with like effect as 
if they had been pleaded, any matters which appropriately support a denial or plea in avoidance of 
the defenses raised in the answer”) (emphasis added).  As Professor Rubenstein has noted, the 
burden of proof on collateral attack with respect to inadequate representation is unclear.  Rubenstein, 
supra note 1, at 815–16.  I do not purport to resolve the issue here.  I note simply that because 
adequate representation is a jurisdictional issue, it might well make sense to treat adequate 
representation like other jurisdictional issues on collateral review. 
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Still others advocate no preclusion, positing that the collateral-attack 
court should determine the constitutional question de novo.154 
But the notion that claim preclusion provides a basis for refusing to 
permit an absent class member to challenge adequacy of representation 
obscures what is going on in these cases.  If the F2 court concludes that 
(1) the finding of the class court on adequacy is entitled to issue-
preclusive effect or (2) the absent class member waived his adequacy 
objection by not raising it in the class court, the class judgment may be 
entitled to claim-preclusive effect.  But claim preclusion cannot bar an 
absent class member from arguing that he or she has been inadequately 
represented because the question of adequate representation is separate 
and distinct from the claim that is barred or merged into the judgment.155  
The requirement that a litigant have a “full and fair opportunity” to make 
his or her case is a basic requirement of due process, applicable, to be 
sure—but not limited to—the law of claim preclusion.156  Courts that 
stress that absent class members had a “full and fair opportunity” to raise 
alleged defects of representation in the rendering court are best 
understood as making an argument that absent class members—by 
failing to take advantage of a full and fair opportunity to object in the 
class proceedings—have waived their right to object to the quality of 
representation that they received in the rendering court. 
Waiver is a legitimate basis for barring collateral attacks for 
inadequate representation, provided constitutional limits on waiver are 
respected.  Put simply, a failure to contest the adequacy of representation 
in a class suit can be treated as a waiver only if the court that entered the 
adequacy findings had authority to compel the absent class member to 
appear in the litigation for the purpose of contesting the adequacy of 
                                                     
 154. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1652–53 (citations omitted). 
 155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) JUDGMENTS, § 24 cmt. a (1982) (noting that the Restatement 
defines the “claim to embrace all the remedial rights of the plaintiff against the defendant growing 
out of the relevant transaction (or series of connected transactions)”).  The Second Restatement also 
provides: “In an action upon the judgment, the defendant cannot avail himself of defenses he might 
have interposed, or did interpose, in the first action.”  Id. § 18(2).  Defense preclusion is equally 
unavailable because inadequate representation is not a defense to a claim asserted in a class action.  
In addressing notice and personal jurisdiction objections in ordinary litigation, the Second 
Restatement of Judgments recognized in any event that “[a]s a conceptual matter, the preclusive 
effect accorded the determination can best be considered as one of issue preclusion . . . although it is 
possible to think of it as one of the defensive matters that is foreclosed by the rule of merger.”  Id. § 
10 cmt. d. 
 156. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480–81 (1982) (“We have 
previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when 
the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a ‘full and fair opportunity’ to 
litigate the claim or issue.” (citations omitted)). 
0.6.0_WOOLLEY FINAL 5/10/2010  12:45:58 PM 
2010] COLLATERAL ATTACK 953 
representation and exercised that authority.  As I explain below in 
Subpart C, the question is essentially one of personal jurisdiction.  Thus, 
if an absent class member is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of the 
rendering court and the court has authority to require—and requires—
those within its jurisdiction to appear for purposes of litigating adequacy, 
the court may treat a failure to appear as a waiver of any objections to the 
adequacy of representation. 
By contrast, courts that focus on whether an asserted defect in 
representation was “actually litigated and determined” are applying issue 
preclusion to the question of adequacy.  Because absent class members 
were not actually present when the issue was litigated and determined, 
however, issue preclusion cannot be applied without considering the 
availability of issue preclusion against absentees.  I address the 
soundness of arguments seeking to apply issue preclusion to absent class 
members in the next subpart. 
B. The Use of Issue Preclusion to Bar Collateral Attacks by Absentees 
Section 3.14 of Aggregate Litigation provides that a class action 
judgment cannot be challenged unless, among other things, the class 
court “failed to make the necessary findings of adequate 
representation.”157  Aggregate Litigation is silent on how detailed the 
“necessary findings” must be and whether the finding must be the 
product of an adversarial proceeding.  The ambiguity of Aggregate 
Litigation on this point leaves open the possibility that Aggregate 
Litigation might be read as authorizing preclusion on the basis of pro 
forma findings rendered without adversarial proceedings.  But Professors 
Issacharoff and Nagareda are far more specific in their joint article.  
They argue that detailed judicial findings with respect to adequacy 
should be given preclusive effect, even in the absence of an adversarial 
proceeding.158  I critique their argument below. 
                                                     
 157. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 3.14(a)(2). 
 158. See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1716–18.  They explain: 
A determination, on our account, means a reasoned determination, not a passing, 
boilerplate dismissal of the structural objection or an unspecific assertion about the 
absence of any structural defect in the class representation.  Rather, the court must 
articulate the alleged defect and explain why it is not disabling. 
Id. at 1717. 
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1. Virtual Representation 
Unless the law of preclusion is to be radically rewritten, as 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda suggest,159 preclusion cannot rest 
solely on the fact that a court has determined the issue.  Absentees 
ordinarily cannot be bound by judgments rendered in their absence.  
Rather, the argument must rest on the premise that an absent class 
member can be bound through representation to the adequacy findings of 
a class court. 
I am deeply skeptical of the contention that a class member can be 
bound by adequacy findings provided the class member was adequately 
represented in hearings about the adequacy of class representation.  As I 
have argued elsewhere, an individual should not be forced to accept a 
representative on the issue of adequacy of representation.160  The Second 
Restatement of Judgments for its part has also recognized that absent 
class members are entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the question 
of adequacy.161  But as I demonstrate below, even if one assumes that 
compelled representation is acceptable in this context, current class 
action practice for handling objections to adequacy does not satisfy the 
stringent requirements for representation set forth by the Supreme Court. 
There is nonetheless scattered support in the lower courts for the 
view that an absent class member can be bound through representation to 
the adequacy findings of a class court.  The most prominent such 
decision is that of the Second Circuit in Wolfert.162  The court in that case 
rejected the view that an absent class member with notice could be 
required to raise his adequacy objections in the class proceeding,163 but 
asserted: 
[I]f, in the class action, a defendant opposing class certification or an 
objector to the settlement had made a serious argument that a sub-class 
was required because of claims substantially similar to hers, and that 
                                                     
 159. Id. at 1715–17. 
 160. See Woolley, supra note 3, at 414–15 (arguing that a class member cannot be bound by a 
representative on the question of adequacy without her consent). 
 161. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND)  OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. a (1982) (“It must be recognized, 
however, that the adequacy of the representation can be established in the action itself only with 
respect to such of the represented persons who have had opportunity to be heard on the 
representation question.  As to others, the question can be concluded only if and when a person 
allegedly represented challenges the judgment’s effect on him.”)  The Second Restatement also 
recognizes (in comment b) that no negative consequences should be attached to the failure of an 
absent class member to take advantage of an opportunity to be heard on adequacy.  See supra note 9. 
 162. Wolfert ex rel. Estate of Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d 165, 172 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 163. Id. at 170–71. 
0.6.0_WOOLLEY FINAL 5/10/2010  12:45:58 PM 
2010] COLLATERAL ATTACK 955 
argument had been considered and rejected by the class action court, it 
would not be unfair to preclude collateral review of that ruling . . . .164 
Judge Wiggins, writing for himself in Epstein v. MCA—the landmark 
case rejecting collateral attack—similarly refused to permit a collateral 
attack by absent class members on the ground that “the adequacy of 
representation issue was fully and fairly litigated and necessarily decided 
in the Chancery Court.”165 
But neither the Second Circuit’s decision in Wolfert, nor Judge 
Wiggins’ opinion in Epstein, is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
more recent decision in Taylor v. Sturgell rejecting the doctrine of virtual 
representation.  As the Court recognized in Taylor, representatives in our 
judicial tradition have been allowed to represent others without their 
consent only in very limited circumstances.166  And with only a couple of 
exceptions—most notably the ability of a designated and adequate class 
representative to bind absentees—the use of representation has been 
highly controversial in the absence of a preexisting relationship grounded 
in the substantive law.167  The notion that defendants (as Wolfert 
suggests)—defendants!—or self-selected objectors with no fiduciary 
obligation to the class could bind absent class members appears flatly 
inconsistent with basic principles of preclusion. 
Taylor makes clear that, at a minimum, (1) the interests of the 
“representative objector” and those who are represented would have to 
be appropriately aligned and (2) the representative objector would have 
to accept responsibility for acting on behalf of all objectors or the court 
would have to take steps to protect those represented.  Serious questions 
can be raised about whether the requirements of adequate representation 
in this context can be met without certification of a “class” of objectors 
or some similar procedure.168  I doubt the practicality of implementing 
                                                     
 164. Id. at 172. 
 165. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 651 (9th Cir. 1999) (Wiggins, J., concurring).  
Significantly, Judge O’Scannlain, who announced the panel’s decision, declined to rely on a virtual 
representation theory.  Id. at 642 (opinion by O’Scannlain, J.). 
 166. Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172–73 (2008). 
 167. As Aggregate Litigation notes in a passage that predates Taylor: 
The leading procedural treatise views the general theory of virtual representation with 
suspicion and cautions against it . . . . The treatise points out that “class action procedure 
provides many explicit safeguards designed to ensure adequate representation” and that 
[v]irtual-representation-theory,” by contrast, “has no explicit safeguards.”  Other 
commentators agree. 
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 8, § 1.05 cmt. a reporters’ note (citing WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 3, at § 4457); see also Tice v. Am. Airlines Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968–73 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 168. I believe the law on this point was clear even before Taylor.  See Woolley, supra note 3, at 
413–14. 
0.6.0_WOOLLEY FINAL 5/10/2010  12:45:58 PM 
956 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
class certification requirements (or their functional equivalent) in the 
context of fairness hearings.  And even if it were practical to comply 
with the requirements of Taylor in this context, a collateral attack on the 
representation provided by the representative objector should still be 
available.  In short, the theoretical and practical problems posed by a 
“representative objector” approach are formidable. 
2. The Role of the Court 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda bluntly argue that collateral 
attack should be available only to the extent that grounds for the 
challenge have not already specifically been addressed by a court.  As 
they explain: 
[W]hat should matter for a collateral attack is the rigor of the rendering 
court’s determination of the structural question, not necessarily whether 
the question has been “actually litigated” by someone in the familiar, 
adversarial litigation sense. . . . 
 . . . A determination, on our account, means a reasoned 
determination, not a passing, boilerplate dismissal of the structural 
objection or an unspecific assertion about the absence of any structural 
defect in the class representation.  Rather, the court must articulate the 
alleged defect and explain why it is not disabling.169 
                                                     
 169. Issacharoff & Nagreda, supra note 6, at 1716–17.  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda 
recognize that their approach would require “relaxation” of the notion of “party” status and argue 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Devlin v. Scardelletti may “show the way.”  Id. at 1716 (citing 
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2005)); see also id. at 1708–09.  Professors Issacharoff and 
Nagareda’s reliance on Devlin is puzzling.  The Devlin Court sensibly held that a class member who 
objects to the settlement during the fairness hearings need not intervene for purposes of appealing 
the class judgment; such a class member will be treated as a “party” for purposes of appeal.  Devlin, 
536 U.S. at 7.  Devlin notes that the definition of a “party” may vary depending on the policies 
underlying a particular area of law.  Id. at 7–8.  But Devlin is not in tension with Hansberry’s 
insistence that fundamental policies rooted in the Due Process Clause require adequate 
representation in fact before an absent class member may be treated as a “party” to a class judgment 
for purposes of preclusion.  Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (“It is familiar doctrine of 
the federal courts that members of a class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the 
judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present . . . .”).  It is true 
that the Court in Devlin stated that “in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt out of the 
settlement, appealing the approval of the settlement was petitioner’s only means of protecting 
himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable . . . . “ 536 U.S. at 10-
11 (emphasis added).  But the petitioner in Devlin made an appearance in the litigation by objecting 
to the settlement in a fairness hearing.  Id. at 3–5.  Devlin has no bearing on the rights of absent class 
members who have been inadequately represented.  Cf. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, § 3.14 cmt. a 
reporters’ notes (misquoting Devlin by suggesting that “appealing the approval of the settlement is [a 
class member’s] only means of protecting himself from being bound. . . .”). 
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They insist that limiting collateral review to arguments not addressed by 
the class court will create “an incentive for settling counsel to build a 
body of evidence to elicit and support the rendering court’s 
determination of structural defects with the potential to form the grounds 
for collateral attack.”170  But even granting that settling counsel will have 
an incentive to build a rich record on the question of adequacy,171 their 
approach is highly problematic.  The argument that what truly matters is 
a reasoned determination by a court—rather than the presence of the 
affected party or his representative—has never been accepted by the 
Court outside the limited context of stare decisis.172 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda argue that a reasoned 
determination by the judge supervising the class suit is sufficient because 
the judge has a fiduciary responsibility to the class.173  There can be no 
question that courts share responsibility for assuring adequate 
representation.174  But as the literature has shown, judges conducting 
class actions—as well as class counsel—have structural conflicts with 
the class.175  Moreover, it seems obvious that competent counsel for an 
objector would be in a better position to advance the interests of the 
                                                     
 170. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1718.  The emphasis that Professors Issacharoff 
and Nagareda place on creating incentives for counsel to create a rich record on the adequacy of the 
settlement and on requiring the class court to provide a reasoned determination of the adequacy issue 
addresses some of the objections to reliance on the trial court’s decision-making.  See Woolley, 
supra note 3, at 412 (stating that trial courts may “lack information to make an informed evaluation 
of the fairness of the settlement” and, in any event, are disinclined to rigorously evaluate a settlement 
(quoting Macey & Miller, supra note 20, at 45–47)). 
 171. But see Struve, supra note 90, at 2147 (noting that Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda’s 
proposal might have a different result). 
 172. As argued above, courts that have barred collateral attack have relied—explicitly or 
implicitly—on either a virtual representation theory or a waiver theory.  See supra Part III.A. 
 173. See Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1716. 
 174. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (e), (g); see also Kahan & Silberman, The Inadequate Search, 
supra note 5, at 781–82 (“The judge in F-1, who approves a settlement and makes a finding of 
adequate representation (as well as substantive fairness), will be in a position—in fact, is required—
to find out whether class counsel up to this point adequately represented the class members.”).  
Indeed, courts have recognized this obligation even while upholding the right to collateral attack.  
See, e.g., Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co., 422 F. Supp. 526, 533 (W.D. La. 1976) (noting that a 
court, “as trustee for the absent parties, must evaluate the class representative’s conduct of the entire 
litigation,” but recognizing that a court is powerless to bind absent class members to a judgment 
unless they are adequately represented at every stage of the proceedings) (citing Gonzales v. 
Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
 175. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 20, at 1717 (arguing that the court’s “independent interest in 
settling cases on its docket” means that “most courts are unlikely to engage in an independent 
rigorous examination of . . . the adequacy of the representation in accomplishing [a] settlement”); 
Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to Opt-Out 
Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 164 (2003) (“Even the most conscientious of courts, moreover, 
must undertake class settlement review against the sirens’ call to sign off on the deal as a means of 
docket clearance.”); see also Woolley, supra note 3, at 412 n.120 (collecting academic literature on 
point). 
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objector (and those similarly situated) than would even a hands-on court 
because a class court has dueling obligations as an impartial arbiter and a 
“fiduciary” of the class. 
Peter Schuck vividly describes how Judge Weinstein acted as 
anything but a fiduciary of the class during the settlement negotiations in 
Agent Orange: “The real obstacle to a $200 million settlement, [Special 
Master David] Shapiro soon realized, was not the chemical companies 
but Judge Weinstein. . . . All things considered, [Judge Weinstein] 
insisted, $180 million plus interest was the fair amount.”176  After 
meeting with Judge Weinstein, the special masters met with defense 
counsel and told them that class counsel “was not about to go below 
$200 million.”177  When defense counsel indicated that they might 
increase their offer, “Shapiro surprised them by urging them to ‘stay 
where you are.  Let the judge get them off the $200 million.’”178  The 
case settled for $180 million plus interest.179  But, as Professor Schuck 
notes, there is evidence that defendants were prepared to settle the case 
for much more than Judge Weinstein engineered.180 
For all these reasons, the class judge—even with the aid of 
counsel—is not an appropriate substitute for an adequate objector.  In 
short, to the extent issue preclusion is available to bar an absent class 
member on the basis of adequacy, it must be applied in accordance with 
the strict limits on representation set forth in Taylor v. Sturgell.181 
                                                     
 176. SCHUCK, supra note 79, at 159.  David Shapiro recalls: 
As a negotiator, I did not regard any particular figure as objectively “fair” or “right.”  
Instead I was guided by the principle that the parties themselves are the best judges of 
what is fair, and I asked myself, “What is the most I can get defendants to agree to 
without squeezing them for every last cent?”  At that point in the game, that figure was 
$200 million.  After trial began, it might be higher.  But the judge’s perspective was 
different, more principled and I respect him for it.  When I later explained to Len Rivkin 
why the judge stuck at $180 million when he could have gotten more, Rivkin said, “The 
man’s too much of an idealist.” 
Id. 
 177. Id. at 160. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 165. 
 180. Professor Schuck writes: 
Most [defendants] were delighted with the outcome; according to Rivkin, Dow was 
pleased because “the amount they had to pay in settlement was so small.” (One lawyer 
later indicated that his client, having studied what a jury might do to it, would have been 
willing to settle for twice the amount.)  One disinterested observer who was very 
knowledgeable about the case had believed that the case could settle for $400 million.  
Newsweek, reporting on the settlement, wrote that defendants’ lawyers “privately chortled 
that they had walked away after paying only ten cents on the dollar.” 
Id. at 166. 
 181. 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171–78 (2008). 
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C. Jurisdiction and Adequate Representation 
The argument that a class member’s failure to contest the adequacy 
of representation in the class court constitutes a waiver of adequacy 
objections presupposes that the class court has power to compel an 
absent class member to appear for purposes of litigating her adequacy 
objections.  That assumption is open to serious question. 
In thinking about personal jurisdiction in ordinary litigation, it is 
critical to distinguish between two separate but interrelated issues: (1) 
whether a person can be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a court, 
i.e., amenability to personal jurisdiction;182 and (2) whether the court has 
provided adequate notice that an individual has been subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the court and must appear to protect his interests.  
Although “personal jurisdiction” is often used to refer solely to the 
amenability requirement, there should be no doubt that personal 
jurisdiction in ordinary litigation also requires notice that the person who 
has been sued must appear to protect his interests.183  In Griffin v. Griffin, 
for example, the United States Supreme Court had no difficulty 
concluding that a judgment “without actual notice to or appearance by 
petitioner, and without any form of service of process calculated to give 
him notice of the proceedings” meant that there was a “want of that 
jurisdiction over the person . . . prerequisite to the rendition of a 
judgment in personam against him.”184 
The interrelationship between notice and amenability is evident in 
the fact that service of process on an individual within the forum state 
may serve both to establish amenability to personal jurisdiction and to 
provide notice that an appearance is necessary.  But the amenability 
requirement nonetheless has its source in concerns distinct from the 
                                                     
 182. In The Availability of Collateral Attack, I referred to this requirement as the “jurisdictional 
nexus” requirement.  Woolley, supra note 3, at 395. 
 183. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §5.16 at 324 (4th ed. 2004) (“In 
the United States there are other preconditions to effective judicial action commonly termed 
‘jurisdictional.’  One important requirement is that the defendant be given reasonable notice of the 
proceedings against him.”); Harold L. Korn, The Development of Judicial Jurisdiction in the United 
States: Part I, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 970 (1999) (noting that notice and an opportunity to be heard 
are part of “Anglo-American conceptions of judicial jurisdiction”); Developments in the Law—State 
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 987 (1960) (“Since failure to provide proper notice, like 
absence of jurisdiction over the parties, will subject a judgment to collateral attack, it has been said 
that adequate notice is a prerequisite to jurisdiction.”). 
 184. 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946). (“Because of the [lack of notice], and to the extent that petitioner 
was thus deprived of an opportunity to raise defenses otherwise open to him under the law of New 
York against the docketing of judgment for accrued alimony, there was a want of judicial due 
process, and hence want of that jurisdiction over the person of petitioner prerequisite to the rendition 
of a judgment in personam against him.”). 
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notice requirement.  The amenability requirement is designed to protect 
an individual’s liberty interest in avoiding a forum that lacks an 
appropriate connection with or that would be seriously inconvenient for 
the litigant.  The notice requirement, by contrast, is designed to put a 
person on notice that he must defend the underlying property or liberty 
interest at stake in the proceeding on pain of adverse consequences. 
Hansberry v. Lee—the Court’s seminal decision on personal 
jurisdiction in class suits— held that adequate representation in class 
litigation can substitute for service of process in ordinary litigation.185  
The Hansberry Court cited Pennoyer v. Neff for the traditional rule—
now defunct—that in personam jurisdiction in ordinary litigation 
requires service of process on the litigant within the forum.186  But while 
the amenability requirement may now be satisfied without service of 
process in the forum, adequacy remains at the core of the jurisdictional 
inquiry in class actions.187  As I explain below, the policies that underlie 
the notice and amenability requirements in ordinary litigation generally 
are implemented through the adequate representation requirement in 
class litigation. 
1. Adequate Representation as a Substitute for Service of Process 
Service of process provides notice that a person must appear in the 
litigation to protect his or her interests.  But such notice is unnecessary in 
a class suit.188  The very idea that absent class members must appear in 
the litigation to defend their interests is inconsistent with the 
representative nature of class suits.189  As Shutts explained, “an absent 
                                                     
 185. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (stating that in some circumstances adequate 
representation “may bind members of the class . . . who were not made parties” through service of 
process). 
 186. Id. at 40 (“It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one 
is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to 
which he has not been made a party by service of process.”) (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 
(1877)). 
 187. See infra Part III.C.1–5; see also Diane P. Wood, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class 
Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 621 (1987) (recognizing that under a representational model “the decision 
of the plaintiff representative to bring the action in a particular state is enough to support the 
jurisdiction of the forum to rule on the claims of the remainder of the class as well . . .  as long as the 
plaintiff adequately represents the class.”). 
 188. I have argued elsewhere, see Woolley, supra note 18, at 571, that notice—as opposed to 
process—is nonetheless required to protect an absent class member’s “opportunity to be heard and 
participate in the litigation.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 787, 812 (1985) (emphasis 
added). 
 189. As the Fifth Circuit has explained: 
The purpose of Rule 23 would be subverted by requiring a class member who learns of a 
pending suit involving a class of which he is a part to monitor that litigation to make 
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class action plaintiff is not required to do anything.  He may sit back and 
allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are 
safeguards for his protection.”190  Because adequate representation in 
class litigation substitutes for service of process in ordinary litigation, 
adequate representation is properly understood as a prerequisite to 
personal jurisdiction over absent class members. 
The requirement in Shutts that absent class members receive “notice 
plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation”191 has 
sometimes led to confusion on this point.  If Shutts requires notice and an 
opportunity to be heard—precisely what service of process provides—
why should adequate representation have jurisdictional significance?  Put 
simply, notice and opportunity to be heard provide absent class members 
with an option to participate;192 service of process, by contrast, notifies a 
person of a command to participate or suffer the risk of adverse 
consequences.  It is adequate representation—not the option to 
participate—that renders unnecessary service of process on absent class 
members. 
Congress or a state legislature, of course, is free to conclude that 
efficient aggregation requires that mass litigation be only partly 
                                                                                                                       
certain that his interests are being protected; this is not his responsibility—it is the 
responsibility of the class representative to protect the interests of all class members. 
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 76 (5th Cir. 1973).  See also Lilly, supra note 3, at 1049 (“Once 
an absent member is compelled to channel her adequacy objections into the class court, she no 
longer retains the privilege of a represented plaintiff who may sit back and allow the litigation to run 
its course under the guidance of the class representative and the class counsel.”); Woolley, supra 
note 3, at 397–99 (recognizing that the fundamental character of a class suit is its representative 
nature” and noting that requiring absent class members to assert an objection in the class 
proceedings would be “a major step away from the representative model”); infra notes 192–96 and 
accompanying text. 
 190. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810. 
 191. Id. at 812. 
 192. As Federal Practice and Procedure has cogently explained: 
Actual notice, the opportunity to opt out (when it is afforded), the opportunity to appear 
and participate, and the opportunity to object to settlement, are opportunities.  They are 
not obligations.  Representative class members, class counsel, the court, and a class 
adversary who wishes the security of preclusion are responsible for ensuring actually 
adequate representation. 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, at 485.  See also George M. Strickler, Jr., Protecting the Class: The 
Search for the Adequate Representative in Class Action Litigation, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 73, 157 
(1985).  Professor Strickler emphatically rejects 
the suggestion that a class member who receives notice and passively acquiesces in the 
action in some way commits himself or herself to the representative team and accepts the 
binding effect of the litigation regardless of the representative’s performance.  Neither 
Rule 23 nor the due process clause allows such an anomalous result.  A class member 
who has elected to remain in the class has not waived the right . . . to seek to be relieved 
from a judgment or settlement of the class claim. 
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representative and to amend the federal or state class rule accordingly to 
permit process-like notice.193  But nothing in the text of Federal Rule 23 
authorizes class courts to require absent class members to raise adequacy 
objections in the class court, and the Advisory Committee notes make 
clear that the omission was not a drafting error.  The drafters of Federal 
Rule 23 cited section 116 of the Restatement of Judgments, comment b 
of which provides in relevant part: “Where a person is not a party to a 
class action the judgment therein has conclusive effect against him only 
if his interests were adequately represented . . .  [A] person as to whom a 
class action is ineffective is not required to seek relief during the 
continuance of the action . . . .”194  The understanding reflected in the 
text of Federal Rule 23, and expressly stated in section 116 of the First 
Restatement represented the consensus view until quite recently.195  
Thus, it would be a mistake to construe Rule 23 (and its state-law 
equivalents) as granting courts power under Rule 23 (or its state-law 
equivalents) to issue process-like notices compelling absentees to raise 
adequacy objections in the class court.196  For this reason alone, the 
failure of an absent class member to raise adequacy objections in the 
class suit itself cannot constitute a waiver of the argument that he or she 
has been inadequately represented. 
But even if a court were granted authority to issue process-like notice 
requiring absent class members to litigate their adequacy objections in 
the class court, personal jurisdiction requirements would limit that grant 
of authority in connection with absent class members who lack minimum 
contacts with the class forum.  As I explain in the next three subparts, if a 
class member lacks minimum contacts with the forum, his failure to opt 
out does not permit the class court to insist that the absent class member 
assert any objections to the adequacy of representation in the class court. 
                                                     
 193. Professor Rubenstein would be in favor of such a rule.  He suggests that an absent class 
member who fails to appear or opt out of the litigation should be deemed to have waived a collateral 
attack on the class judgment, at least if the class member has the appropriate territorial connection 
with the class forum.  Rubenstein, supra note 1, at 865–66. 
 194. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 116 cmt. b (1942) (emphasis added).  The Second 
Restatement is in accord.  See supra note 9. 
 195. See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 2–4 and 
accompanying text. 
 196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 42 cmt. b (contrasting the use of notice in class 
actions with process in ordinary litigation); supra note 189. 
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2. Amenability to Personal Jurisdiction in the Absence of Consent 
Aggregate Litigation fundamentally misconceives the role of 
personal jurisdiction in multistate class litigation.  Indeed, in the context 
of class actions, Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda are remarkably 
dismissive of limits on the authority of courts to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over persons lacking an appropriate connection with the 
forum state.  They write: 
 The simple fact is that national markets transcend the territorial 
boundaries of particular states.  As a result, national markets give rise 
to both legal claims and demands for closure that are national in scope.  
Where jurisdiction realistically cannot turn on some vestigial notion of 
territoriality, the basis for the rendering court’s assertion of authority 
over absent class members must proceed on some other basis—in 
Shutts, implied consent to a process that combines rights in the nature 
of self-help (exit and voice rights) with a right to oversight by 
fiduciaries (loyalty rights) . . . .197 
As I discuss below, there is little doubt that Congress may authorize 
federal courts to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction over absent 
members of a class.198  But in suggesting that the existence of national 
markets that give rise to claims and demands for closure that are national 
in scope somehow relaxes the limits on state-court personal jurisdiction, 
Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda suggest that traditional 
understandings of personal jurisdiction in the context of class actions are 
simply outmoded.  But, if anything, respect for the traditional conception 
of personal jurisdiction is especially important in sprawling multistate 
class suits, which may draw into their webs absent class members who 
lack an appropriate connection with the forum state.  And Shutts—on 
which Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda heavily rely to support their 
jurisdictional argument—cannot properly be understood except in the 
context of the policies served by the amenability requirement. 
In ordinary litigation, a person is amenable to the personal 
jurisdiction of a state if (1) she has minimum contacts with the state and 
                                                     
 197. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1702 (citing Shutts, 472 U.S. at 809).  For an 
article briefly discussing the possibility that Congress has power to free state courts from ordinary 
limits on state personal jurisdiction in some contexts, see Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in 
Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1615–21 (1992).  I am skeptical that Congress has 
the power to free state courts from the limits on state court personal jurisdiction imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) 
(“Congress’ power under § 5 . . . extends only to ‘enforc[ing]’ the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
 198. See infra Part III.C.5 
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(2) the exercise of jurisdiction in that state would be reasonable.199  As I 
discuss below, the minimum contacts prong protects a person from being 
subjected to the personal jurisdiction of a forum state that does not have 
an appropriate connection with the person whose rights are being 
adjudicated.  The reasonableness prong, on the other hand, protects a 
person from being haled into a forum that is unreasonably inconvenient. 
It has been argued that personal jurisdiction should be understood to 
simply protect against inconvenience.200  But the Court’s cases strongly 
suggest that protecting against inconvenience is not the primary function 
of personal jurisdiction.  In World-Wide Volkswagen, for example, the 
Court stated that limits on personal jurisdiction are designed both to 
protect state sovereign authority and to protect individuals from being 
haled into an inconvenient forum.201  The Court later backed away from 
the assertion that personal jurisdiction independently protects state 
sovereign authority, concluding instead that limits on personal 
jurisdiction are intended to protect the liberty interests of individual 
persons.202  But the conclusion that limits on personal jurisdiction protect 
                                                     
 199. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).  I address only the limits 
on personal jurisdiction imposed by the Constitution.  In so doing, I assume for purposes of this 
discussion that, in the absence of consent, amenability to personal jurisdiction in ordinary litigation 
requires minimum contacts.  See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (“We therefore 
conclude that all assertions of state court territorial jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the 
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”).  Courts have recognized other 
constitutionally sufficient bases for personal jurisdiction, none of which appear relevant to the 
question at hand: the constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction in class suits for money damages. 
 200. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A 
Theoretical Evaluation, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1112, 1137 (1981) (“[T]he only concern of a principled 
due process jurisdictional analysis should be the avoidance of inconvenience to the defendant.”); 
Ralph U. Whitten, Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive 
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 735, 846 (1981) (stating that a court should have “jurisdiction to adjudicate an action against 
any defendant, unless the defendant demonstrates that the relative burdens imposed by suit in the 
particular court are so great that the defendant is, as a practical matter, unable to defend there 
adequately.”); see also Louise Weinberg, The Place of Trial and the Law Applied: Overhauling 
Constitutional Theory, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 102 (1988) (“Given the availability of forum non 
conveniens, and independent review of choice of law for fundamental fairness, defendants simply do 
not need all of the constitutional protection from plaintiff’s choice of forum that the Supreme Court 
keeps lavishing on them.”). 
 201. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 202. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 702 & 
n.10 (1982) (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty 
interest.  It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty.”).  Shutts explained that the “purpose” of the jurisdictional test “is to protect a 
defendant from the travail of defending in a distant forum, unless the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum make it just to force him to defend there.”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
807 (1985).  I do not read the reference to the “travail of defending in a distant forum” as suggesting 
that limits on personal jurisdiction are designed to protect solely against inconvenience.  Rather, I 
read that phrase as referring to the burdens of litigating in any forum that is not the litigant’s home 
 
0.6.0_WOOLLEY FINAL 5/10/2010  12:45:58 PM 
2010] COLLATERAL ATTACK 965 
mostly against inconvenience is at odds with the continued insistence of 
the Court that, before a forum state may exercise personal jurisdiction 
without consent, the person must have purposeful contacts of a nature 
and quality to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
The purposeful-contacts requirement cannot be explained on the 
basis of convenience, as a simple example demonstrates.  Suppose A 
lives in New York, but has never established purposeful contacts with 
New Jersey.  Litigation in New Jersey might nonetheless be more 
convenient for A—if, for example, A lives much closer to a courthouse in 
New Jersey than New York.  Yet, in the absence of purposeful contacts, 
New Jersey will not be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over A 
without A’s consent.  A might choose not to consent if New York would 
be a more advantageous forum—if, for example, New York’s jury 
practice would be more favorable to A’s case than New Jersey’s or if 
New York’s choice-of-law rules would lead to a more favorable result. 
The point is that states have enormous latitude in structuring the 
background rules that govern adjudication of disputes in their courts.  
And those rules may have a substantial effect on the outcome of the 
litigation.203  For that reason, fundamental fairness properly can be said 
to require that only states with an appropriate connection to a person 
have power to force that person or his representatives to appear without 
consent.204  The purposeful-contacts requirement, in other words, 
                                                                                                                       
base.  As I discuss in the text below, these burdens include the application of the forum’s choice-of-
law rules, jury rules, etc.  See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and 
Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 255 (1991) (“Choice of judicial jurisdiction is choice of law 
because choosing a jurisdiction chooses the legal regime that will select, interpret and apply the 
policies that will determine the result in the particular case.”).  Professors Maier and McCoy 
formulate the point even more broadly: 
The legal result in a case is influenced by many attributes of the forum in addition to the 
rules of law that it chooses to apply.  These attributes include the local predilections, 
vagaries, biases and informal understandings of the forum’s juries and judges, e.g., the 
local propensities of juries to act in given ways independent of the legal rules under 
which they are charged, and the judicial biases conditioned by experience and custom in 
the community that the judge serves. 
Id. at 253–54 (footnotes omitted); see also Edward H. Cooper, Rewriting Shutts for Fun, Not to 
Profit, 74 UMKC L. REV. 569, 575 (2006) (recognizing that the forum-sovereign “will supply its 
own judge, draw the jury if the case progresses to trial in that mode, apply its own procedure, make 
the choice of governing ‘substantive’ law, and determine the content of the chosen law,” and noting 
that “one sovereign may behave quite differently from others”). 
 204. My colleague, Russell Weintraub, has proposed a radical simplification of the jurisdictional 
inquiry.  He argues that due process should be understood to require “only that the forum have some 
rational basis for wishing to decide the case, either because the plaintiff resides there or because the 
defendant acted or caused consequences there, or both.”  RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 196 (2006) (discussing suits by United States plaintiffs against United 
States defendants).  Professor Weintraub would deal with any “unfairness” by “transfer to a more 
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protects a person’s liberty interest in being free from the exercise of 
sovereign authority by states that lack an appropriate connection with the 
person.205 
The second prong of the amenability analysis protects against 
deprivations of liberty that would result from requiring a person to 
litigate in a seriously inconvenient forum.  As set out in Burger King, the 
court must weigh a number of factors, including inconvenience to the 
defendant, typically the party challenging the personal jurisdiction of the 
court.206  While inconvenience to the defendant is only one of the factors 
considered by the Court, it is of necessity the focal point of the inquiry.  
In ordinary litigation, after all, it is only the defendant who is required to 
appear in the forum state and thus be deprived of liberty in a manner that 
invokes the protections of the Due Process Clause.  Put another way, the 
                                                                                                                       
appropriate forum.”  Id.  His proposal recognizes that a forum’s choice-of-law rules may be a serious 
source of unfairness: 
If the forum’s sole nexus is the plaintiff’s residence, it would be unfair to the defendant to 
allow suit there if this would result in choosing law more unfavorable to the defendant 
than would be chosen in all states that have contacts with both the parties and the 
transaction. 
Id.  I share Professor Weintraub’s frustration with the complexity of current constitutional doctrine 
and the irrationality of some court decisions, but I do not think his proposal adequately takes into 
account the substantial effect the choice of forum may have on the outcome of the litigation. 
 205. Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.1 at 270 (2d ed. 1995) (“The connection 
between sovereignty and personal jurisdiction doctrine is that states are simply not entitled to assert 
their authority over individuals who lack an appropriate connection.”); id. at 271 (“In personal 
jurisdiction, it is the individual’s right to be left alone by a state that has no legitimate authority over 
him or her that the due process clause protects.”).  While I generally agree with Professor Brilmayer 
that an exercise of jurisdictional authority requires “an appropriate connection” between an 
individual and a forum state, I believe that “fundamental fairness” occasionally permit exceptions.  I 
am not troubled, for example, by the fact that Shutts permits states to require that absent class 
members who wish to pursue litigation individually opt-out, even if class members lack contacts 
with the forum state.  Fundamental fairness requires an “appropriate connection” with the forum 
because “states have enormous latitude in structuring the background rules that govern adjudication 
of disputes in their courts,” and “those rules may have a substantial effect on the outcome of the 
litigation.”  See supra note 203 and accompanying text.  As I discuss below, Shutts adequately takes 
these considerations into account through the adequate representation requirement. 
 206. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (identifying factors to be 
weighed as “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ 
‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the 
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies’”) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 
(1987) (noting that in cases with connections to foreign countries, the fifth factor should be 
understood to call for consideration of “the procedural and substantive policies of other nations 
whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by the California court”); id. (noting that 
the interests of other nations “as well as the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations 
policies, will be best served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of 
jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on an alien 
defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum State”). 
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key question is whether the inconvenience to the defendant is of 
sufficient magnitude—in light of the other interests at stake—to violate 
due process. 
For good reason, there is no reference in Shutts to the reasonableness 
prong.  As the Court noted, what distinguishes class litigation from 
ordinary litigation is that an absent class member may sit back and 
“allow the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are 
safeguards provided for his protection.”207  In other words, the court and 
class counsel are required to protect the interests of an absent class 
member.  Because a class member need not appear in the forum to 
protect his or her interests, there is no reason to think that inconvenience 
resulting from litigation in a particular forum could be sufficiently 
serious to give rise to a constitutional injury.  Thus, the Court’s failure to 
even discuss the reasonableness prong in Shutts provides further 
evidence that class action rules do not require an absent class member to 
raise an adequacy objection in the class court on pain of waiver. 
3. Consent and the Role of Adequate Representation 
Proponents of limitations on collateral attack have ridiculed the 
notion that adequate representation has any role to play in whether a 
court has personal jurisdiction over an absent class member,208 often 
arguing instead that the failure to opt out—without more—constitutes 
consent to the personal jurisdiction of a class court.209  There is no 
question that consent is an adequate basis for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.  The much harder question is whether a simple failure to opt 
out—assuming adequate notice—provides a sufficient basis for 
concluding that an absent class member has consented to personal 
jurisdiction. 
The jurisdictional significance that Shutts attaches to a failure to opt 
out of a class suit is unique in the annals of personal jurisdiction.  There 
is no other context in which a forum that lacks an appropriate territorial 
                                                     
 207. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810. 
 208. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy, supra note 6, at 311 (criticizing Professor Monaghan 
as subscribing to the view that personal jurisdiction in Shutts is of a “provisional, twilight-zone” 
nature). (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent 
Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1173, 1179, 1183, 1186, 1197 (1998)). 
 209. See, e.g., Kahan & Silberman, Matsushita, supra note 5, at 263–64 (arguing that notice and 
an opportunity to opt out are sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over absent class 
members); see also Monaghan, supra note 208, at 1173 (“[C]ourts and commentators alike have 
focused on Shutts’s requirement of a right to opt out of damage claims as a sufficient condition for 
the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.”).  Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda have a more 
nuanced position.  See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
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connection to a person can require a person to do anything.210  It is true, 
of course, that a party who appears in litigation may waive his or her 
jurisdictional objection by failing to comply with the procedural rules of 
the forum.211  But in such a case, the party has in fact done something.  
By entering an appearance, the party who claims that the court lacks 
personal jurisdiction has at a minimum consented to the personal 
jurisdiction of the court for the limited purpose of having his or her 
jurisdictional objections adjudicated in accordance with the procedural 
rules of the forum.212 
A class court’s power to treat a failure to opt out as jurisdictionally 
significant cannot be explained by asserting that territorial connections 
between the litigant and the forum are less important in the class context 
than in others.  Absent class members subjected to the personal 
jurisdiction of a court are no less bound by the forum’s rules than other 
litigants,213 and it is the primary role of personal jurisdiction to protect 
persons without an appropriate connection to the forum from being 
subjected to the rules of the forum.  What makes class litigation different 
is that an absent class member need not appear in the forum to protect his 
or her interests.  It is worth quoting Shutts at length on this point: 
Petitioner claims that failure to execute and return the “request for 
exclusion” provided with the class notice cannot constitute consent of 
the out-of-state plaintiffs . . . . 
 . . . . 
                                                     
 210. See Lilly, supra note 3, at 1034.  Professor Lilly explains: “In ordinary litigation, there is no 
instance in which a defendant is brought within a court’s personal jurisdiction by the simple failure 
to respond to a summons or other document from the court.  Such a rule would very likely be 
unconstitutional.”  Id. 
 211. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g), (h); see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinée, 456 U.S. 694, 705 (1982) (recognizing that “the failure to enter a timely objection to 
personal jurisdiction constitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of the objection”). 
 212. Professor Lilly provides another example: 
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, allows waiver of the formal 
service of process, but it still requires the recipient to make affirmative contact with the 
court to extend the court’s jurisdiction over the non-resident.  The Advisory Committee 
in fact explicitly rejected the idea that a court could extend personal jurisdiction over a 
non-resident defendant merely through his failure to respond to mailed service.  While it 
is true that personal jurisdiction can, for example, be acquired through a consent 
transmitted by mail, the defendant must affirmatively register her submission to this 
territorial jurisdiction. 
Lilly, supra note 3, at 1034–35. 
 213. It is true that absent class members may not be bound by certain rules inconsistent with 
their status as absentees, but as with any litigant, they are subject to the forum’s conflict-of-law 
rules, jury-trial rules, summary-judgment rules, etc. 
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 We think the petitioner’s premise is in error.  The burdens placed by 
a state upon an absent class action plaintiff are not of the same order or 
magnitude as those it places upon an absent defendant. . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . . The court and named plaintiffs protect his interests. . . . 
 Besides this continuing solicitude for their rights, absent plaintiff 
class members are not subject to other burdens imposed upon 
defendants.  They need not hire counsel or appear. . . . 
 Unlike a defendant in a normal civil suit, an absent class action 
plaintiff is not required to do anything.  He may sit back and allow the 
litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safeguards 
provided for his protection.214 
In short, the Court in Shutts focused heavily on the fact that an 
individual will not have to act in the forum to protect his interests.  If an 
individual were required to appear in the forum to protect his interests—
as he might well have to do if he were denied the right to collaterally 
attack a judgment for inadequate representation—he would be stripped 
of the very protection on which the Court relied to conclude that a failure 
to opt out could be deemed jurisdictionally significant in the class 
context. 
Tobias Wolff has persuasively argued that a failure to opt out 
provides little evidence of actual consent.215  For that reason, he believes 
that Shutts is best understood as a case of constructive consent: 
[C]lass members should be bound by the proceeding as if they had 
“consented” (or consciously passed up the opportunity to object) 
because the Court believes that, given the type of claim at issue and the 
mechanisms in place for its resolution, some set of core values—
deterrence, fairness, efficiency, even-handed administration of similar 
claims—will be well served by that legal fiction.216 
                                                     
 214. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806–10 (1985). 
 215. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the 
Nationwide Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2088–90 (2008) (rejecting as empirically 
unfounded the Shutts Court’s assumption that “it is generally appropriate to treat the notice and opt-
out procedure as one that elicits a meaningful expression of simple consent from class members 
(‘unwilling to execute an opt out form’) or, at least, as one that generally causes the class member to 
become engaged with the proceedings in a sufficiently active manner that it is appropriate to treat a 
failure to respond as a waiver of objections and, hence, as procedural consent (‘presumed to consent 
to being a member of the class by his failure to do so’)”) (footnotes omitted). 
 216. Id. at 2092. 
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There is much to be said for Professor Wolff’s view—a view that 
supports the conclusion that a failure to opt out is not alone sufficient to 
establish personal jurisdiction. 
But I would articulate differently the justification for authorizing 
jurisdiction over individuals who cannot realistically be said to consent 
to personal jurisdiction.  Put simply, the adequate-representation 
requirement—properly understood—safeguards the fundamental policies 
effectuated through the amenability requirement of personal jurisdiction.  
Because a class member is represented in the litigation and need not 
appear for any reason, the protection against inconvenience offered 
through the reasonableness prong is superfluous.  Moreover, adequate 
representation—properly understood—provides an absent class member 
with no less protection against the sovereign authority of the forum than 
does the appropriate-connection requirement.  Unless otherwise required 
by a forum with an appropriate connection to the class member, an 
adequate representative must pursue the claims of an absentee in the 
forum that would best serve the interests of the absent class member, all 
things considered.217  An absent class member, for example, might 
benefit more from being part of the class suit than filing an individual 
suit in a different forum with more advantageous choice-of-law rules.218  
But assuming that the class member is adequately represented, he will 
not be prejudiced by having his claims resolved by a sovereign that lacks 
an appropriate connection with the class member.219  For all these 
reasons, adequate representation, without more, adequately serves the 
policies implemented by the amenability requirement, at least for absent 
class members who would not otherwise involve themselves in the 
litigation. 
To the extent a class member is motivated and sophisticated enough 
to determine for herself the desirability of the forum, however, she is 
entitled to an opportunity to grant or withhold consent to personal 
jurisdiction; class members should not be required to accept the 
compromises inherent in adequate representation if they wish to 
participate in the litigation.220  But given the administrative difficulties 
                                                     
 217. See Woolley, Choice of Law, supra note 16, at 832–35. 
 218. Id. at 827 (“When obtaining an otherwise beneficial choice-of-law decision would risk 
making the class device unavailable, careful consideration of the risks involved for the affected 
portion of the class might properly lead class counsel to forego certain choice-of-law arguments.”). 
 219. A court with an appropriate connection to an absent class member may have power under 
the Constitution to require litigation of his or her claims in the forum through a representative even if 
another forum would be more advantageous for the absent class member.  See id. at 832–35. 
 220. See Woolley, Shutts and the Adequate Representation Requirement, supra note 16, at 772 
n.53 (“It is in part because the practicalities of class litigation require class counsel to represent 
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inherent in determining whether a particular class member should be 
deemed motivated and sophisticated, it seems clear that identical 
procedures must be used to resolve jurisdictional questions for all class 
members.  So while an affirmative manifestation of consent to personal 
jurisdiction might be the ideal way to determine whether a motivated and 
sophisticated class member consents to personal jurisdiction, nothing so 
burdensome is required.  If notice is received and sufficiently clear to 
meet the requirements of procedural due process,221 a failure to opt out is 
sufficient to manifest consent,222 provided the class member need not 
appear in the forum to protect his or her interest in adequate 
representation. 
4. Limited Jurisdiction in Class Litigation 
Relying on the close link between adequate representation and 
personal jurisdiction suggested in Shutts, Henry Monaghan argued in a 
path-breaking article that the failure to opt out of a class suit represents a 
“limited and conditional” consent to the personal jurisdiction of the class  
 
                                                                                                                       
parties whose interests are not perfectly aligned that class members should be offered either an 
opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation or an opportunity to opt-out.”). 
 221. Given the protections offered in class litigation, the Court concluded that service of process 
is not required, provided that notice is “receive[d].”  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 
812 (1985) (emphasis added); cf. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1453–54 (9th Cir. 1994) (arguing 
that Shutts does not require actual receipt of notice); Cooper, supra note 203, at 576 (“The common 
understanding is that actual notice is not required—the absent class member can be bound by a 
judgment, or settlement, without having known of the action.”); Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
96 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1986) (“[T]he most appropriate reading of Shutts may be that class members 
constitutionally may be included if first-class mail is directed to them and is not returned as 
undeliverable.”).  I do not attempt to determine in this Article whether notice must be actually 
received. 
 222. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he Constitution does not require more to protect what must be 
the somewhat rare species of class member who is unwilling to execute an ‘opt out’ form, but whose 
claim is nonetheless so important that he cannot be presumed to consent to being a member of the 
class by his failure to do so.”).  Because no explicit manifestation of consent is required, the opt-out 
right in this context can best be described—as Lea Brilmayer and Jack Goldsmith have suggested—
as a form of implied consent in fact (in contrast to the implied consent in law criticized by the Court 
in International Shoe).  See L. BRILMAYER & J. GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (5, at 479. 
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court premised on adequate representation of the class member.223  I 
endorsed this view in my first article on collateral attack.224 
The conditional consent paradigm has the virtue of emphasizing the 
close link between adequate representation and personal jurisdiction, a 
link that largely had been ignored before Professor Monaghan published 
his path-breaking article.225  But in the absence of minimum contacts, 
personal jurisdiction in class litigation is even more precisely described 
as a form of limited jurisdiction.  Put simply, a class court has power to 
enter a judgment against an absent class member on the basis of adequate 
representation, but no power to compel an absent class member to appear 
in the forum to contest adequate representation or anything else.  After 
all, the Court’s conclusion in Shutts—that express consent was not 
required—rested on the premise that an absent class member is not 
required to do anything.226 
The concept of limited jurisdiction is an old one, regularly used, for 
example, when courts routinely asserted quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by 
seizing property of the defendant within the jurisdiction.227  A seizure of 
property did not give a court in personam jurisdiction over the defendant, 
but allowed a court to adjudicate the dispute and satisfy any resulting 
judgment from the proceeds of the seized property.228  Thus, the 
jurisdiction of a court premised on the seizure of property had limited 
consequences for a defendant who did not appear in the litigation.229 
                                                     
 223. See Monaghan, supra note 208, at 1154 (“[W]hether Shutts is read as a case of implied 
consent or fundamental fairness, the scope of in personam jurisdiction it countenances over 
nonresident class members lacking minimum contact with the forum is both limited and 
conditional.”).  Professor Monaghan believes the “fundamental fairness” approach is the sounder 
way of understanding Shutts.  See id. at 1170 (arguing that Shutts is best understood as involving 
“jurisdictional forfeiture” and suggesting that “[i]n stretching to discover ‘consent’ . . . . Shutts drew 
upon the Court’s longstanding jurisprudential practice: results are initially explained in terms of an 
‘implied’ consent, and the fictional nature of that explanation is subsequently admitted”). 
 224. See Woolley, supra note 3, at 395. 
 225. Monaghan, supra note 208, at 1166. 
 226. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811. 
 227. 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1070 (2002). 
 228. Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. 308, 318 (1870) (“[I]f there is no appearance of the defendant, 
and no service of process on him, the case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the 
only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the demand which the court 
may find to be due to the plaintiff.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 32(3) cmt. b (1982) 
(noting that a valid judgment based on attachment jurisdiction is “conclusive” only “as to the 
application of the defendant’s interest in the thing to the plaintiff’s claim,” and recognizing that “a 
personal judgment upon that claim cannot be given, nor can any other personal liability be imposed, 
unless the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant’s person”). 
 229. There is a split of authority on whether a defendant who appears in the litigation for the 
purpose of defending his or her property should be deemed to consent to the in personam jurisdiction 
of the court.  See 4B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 227, § 1123 (collecting authority and 
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So too does the reasoning in Shutts suggest that a failure to opt out of 
class litigation should have limited jurisdictional consequences.230  The 
claim that collateral attacks by absent class members who lack minimum 
contacts with the forum must nonetheless be heard in that forum is an 
attempt to evade the limited nature of the jurisdiction conferred by 
Shutts.  For the same reason, the forum court lacks personal jurisdiction 
to enter an antisuit injunction against an absent class member simply 
because the class member failed to opt out of the litigation.  Because a 
valid antisuit injunction subjects a person who violates the injunction to 
penalties for contempt of court,231 the limited jurisdiction authorized by 
Shutts cannot reasonably be read to give courts power to enter an antisuit 
injunction against an absent class member.232  The minimum-contact and 
reasonableness prongs must be satisfied, or the class member must have 
given express consent to personal jurisdiction, before an antisuit 
injunction may be entered against an absent class member consistently 
with the amenability requirement.233 
                                                                                                                       
summarizing the debate).  Because absent class members do not appear in the litigation, this split of 
authority has no bearing on my argument. 
 230. In this vein, Professor Cooper notes that Shutts holds “that ‘a forum State may exercise 
jurisdiction over the claim of an absent class action plaintiff, even though that plaintiff may not 
possess the minimum contacts with the forum which would support personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant.’”  Cooper, supra note 203, at 570 (quoting Shutts, 472 U.S. 808).  He then argues: “These 
words seem to distinguish ‘personal jurisdiction’ over a defendant from a nearly in rem jurisdiction 
over a class member’s claim.  That is a rather neat way of expressing the distinction between 
imposing a liability or extinguishing a claim and imposing significant burdens of litigating on pain 
of default.”  Id.  Professor Cooper nonetheless contends that “the distinction is valid” only “up to a 
point,” concluding that “a class member who does not wish to trust the class representation must do 
something to avoid preclusion, either by opting out or by participating in the action.”  Id. 
 231. See Rhonda Wasserman, The Curious Complications with Back-End Opt-Out Rights, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 413 (2008) (noting that if absent class members “violate an injunction 
that bars them from pressing their claims in state court or from presenting certain evidence in 
support of their claims, they can be held in criminal or civil contempt”). 
 232. See id. (recognizing that holding an absent class member in contempt for violating an 
antisuit injunction is inconsistent with the express rationale of Shutts).  Professor Wasserman has 
noted that Shutts 
distinguished between the burdens borne by defendants and absent plaintiff class 
members: “[A]bsent plaintiff class members . . . are almost never subject to 
counterclaims or cross-claims, or liability for fees or costs.  Absent plaintiff class 
members are not subject to coercive or punitive remedies.  Nor will an adverse judgment 
typically bind an absent plaintiff for any damages . . . .” 
Id. at 412 (quoting Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810). 
 233. Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Syngenta, Stephenson, and the Federal Judicial Injunctive 
Power, 37 AKRON L. REV. 605, 644 (2004) (“[A]n injunction by a federal district judge against a 
nonresident class member’s collateral attack in a distant forum should not succeed unless the absent 
class member otherwise possesses sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.”); Monaghan, 
supra note 208, at 1179–87 (rejecting the view that a class court has personal jurisdiction to enter an 
antisuit injunction against absent class members lacking minimum contacts with the forum).  As I 
discuss in the next subpart, the Constitution does not bar federal courts from using a national-
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5. Amenability to Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts 
My discussion so far has focused primarily on the constitutional 
constraints the amenability requirement imposes on the ability of state 
courts to limit collateral attack.  The constitutional landscape is different 
with respect to federal courts. 
There is substantial support for the view that federal courts may use 
a national-contacts standard consistently with the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.234  It is less clear, however, whether the 
Constitution requires a federal court using a national-contacts standard to 
weigh the reasonableness factors set forth in Burger King (or some 
substantial equivalent) before concluding that it may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a person in ordinary litigation.235  There is much to be 
said for imposing a reasonableness requirement to limit the power of 
federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction.  States can be divested of 
personal jurisdiction when the forum is unreasonably inconvenient, and 
inconvenience would seem to be a much bigger problem in the context of 
nationwide personal jurisdiction.  For that reason, a single-minded focus 
on whether a person has an appropriate connection with the nation seems 
perverse.236 
If protection against unreasonable inconvenience is an integral part 
of a nationwide personal-jurisdiction analysis, the Constitution imposes 
jurisdictional limits on the ability of both state and federal courts to 
require absent class members to raise their jurisdictional objections in the 
                                                                                                                       
contacts standard.  I do not address in this Article the argument that federal courts currently have 
statutory authority in limited circumstances to enforce an antisuit injunction against absent class 
members.  See Wolff, supra note 215, at 2114 (noting that courts have held that enforcement of an 
injunction against nonparties is “clearly available when nonparties aid in subverting an order or 
violating its terms.”). 
 234. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 148, at 424–28 (collecting case law and commentary); 
Casad, supra note 197, at 1600 (noting that the view that the Fifth Amendment requires federal 
courts to use a state contacts standard “is not widely followed”).  The use of a national-contacts 
standard by federal courts is consistent with my analysis of the fundamental policies underlying the 
minimum-contacts requirement.  See supra Part III.C.2. 
 235. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); see Casad, supra note 197, at 
1601–06; Leslie M. Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a “Substantive Right”: The Invalidity of 
Rule 4(k) Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1217 (2000) (“Most courts have rejected 
the notion that even when sufficient affiliating contacts with the nation exist, the Fifth Amendment 
affords the defendant some additional protection from an inconvenient venue within the United 
States.”). 
 236. If the constitutional basis for nationwide personal jurisdiction is properly premised on 
service of process within the nation rather than a contacts analysis, a reasonableness analysis may be 
unnecessary for that reason.  Cf. Burnham v. Sup. Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (plurality 
opinion) (“Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American 
tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in 
the State.”). 
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forum state.  If, on the other hand, the Fifth Amendment does not protect 
against the exercise of personal jurisdiction in an “unreasonably 
inconvenient” forum, the Constitution likely imposes no jurisdictional 
constraints on the ability of a federal court to require absent class 
members who have minimum contacts with the United States to raise 
their adequacy objections in the class court.  Assuming that an absent 
class member has received adequate notice and a fair opportunity to 
litigate the adequacy issue, I would argue that collateral attacks on 
federal class judgments are available only because federal courts 
currently have no authority to require absent class members to object to 
inadequate representation in the class proceedings.237  But should 
Congress authorize process-like notice to require absent class members 
to raise adequacy objections in the class proceeding,238 there likely would 
be no basis for a minimum-contacts objection to the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a federal court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I have set forth an understanding of adequate 
representation and collateral attack that is responsive to the values 
embedded in the adequate-representation standard, the demands of 
preclusion law, and the law of personal jurisdiction, as well as the need 
for reasonable finality of judgments.  By contrast, Aggregate Litigation 
essentially rewrites the law of preclusion and of personal jurisdiction to 
ensure finality.  Indeed, in defending their work, Professors Issacharoff 
and Nagareda have said that we need a new “litigation vocabulary”239 
with respect to preclusion and have dismissed the importance of personal 
                                                     
 237. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 238. I do not consider here whether a simple amendment to Rule 23 authorizing federal courts to 
issue process-like notice requiring absent class members to object in the class proceeding to 
inadequate representation would be consistent with the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072.  Stephen Burbank has stated that, “It is a close question whether Federal Rules 
expanding the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts are valid under the Act, interpreted in the 
light of the pre-1934 history.”  Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1015, 1172 n.673 (1982).  The Supreme Court nonetheless held in an early case that the modest 
expansion of personal jurisdiction worked by then Rule 4(f) met the requirements of the Rules 
Enabling Act.  See Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946).  Since then, the Court 
(as rule-maker) has approved Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), a far more ambitious 
expansion of personal jurisdiction.  See Kelleher, supra note 235, at 1219–22 (noting that Congress 
and the Court were aware of concerns that Rule 4(k)(2) might be inconsistent with the requirements 
of the Rules Enabling Act). 
 239. Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1654 (“Our claim is that the binding effect of a 
class settlement cannot be resolved simply within our inherited litigation vocabulary.”). 
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jurisdiction in multistate class actions.240  But while there is room even 
within the current vocabulary to limit collateral attack if doing so would 
be wise, our “litigation vocabulary” is rooted in basic understandings of 
Due Process.  If we are to revise our basic understanding of what Due 
Process requires in the context of preclusion and personal jurisdiction, 
there should be a showing of necessity. 
As I—and others—have noted, there is no evidence that collateral 
attacks pose a significant problem.241  But even if the empirical evidence 
were to support the view that the availability of collateral attack creates 
substantial problems, there is no reason to think that the problems could 
not be addressed without radically revising our understanding of due 
process.  If a problem exists or even potentially exists, it may well be 
rooted in uncertainty about what adequate representation requires and 
what the appropriate standard of review on collateral attack should be—
both matters that can be resolved by the United States Supreme Court.  
Congress can also respond, if necessary, without upending basic 
principles of preclusion law or fundamental limits on the personal 
jurisdiction of state courts.  Indeed, Congress has power to virtually 
eliminate collateral attacks on federal class judgments by authorizing 
federal courts to issue process-like notice requiring absent class members 
to raise adequacy objections in the class court.242  And to the extent the 
problem with collateral attack is that “anomalous state courts” provide 
fertile fora for inappropriate collateral attacks on class judgments,243 
                                                     
 240. Id. 
 241. Dana, supra note 3, at 322–23 (“Available evidence, although hardly definitive, strongly 
suggests that a rule allowing subsequent challenges to class action settlements will have at most a 
very modest effect on the incidence or timing of settlement in class actions.”); Rubenstein, supra 
note 1, at 833 (noting that “there are but a small number of reported cases challenging class action 
settlements, particularly small when juxtaposed with the thousands of such actions filed annually,” 
but acknowledging the possibility that collateral attacks may increase in number and significance); 
Wolff, supra note 215, at 2122 (noting that “it is still early,” but recognizing that “there does not 
appear to have been any significant increase in collateral attack proceedings since the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Stephenson was issued and left in place by the divided Court”); Woolley, supra 
note 3, at 443 (“Notwithstanding the longstanding availability of collateral attack, such attacks have 
not been common, suggesting that there is no basis for alarmist predictions.”).  For an explanation of 
why one would expect collateral attacks to be relatively rare, see Koniak, supra note 3, at 1858 
(noting that “the chance of persuading . . . another trial[] court . . . to say that the first court erred is 
exceedingly slim” because “[t]rial judges are naturally, and in most cases appropriately, reluctant to 
hold that another trial judge made such an error”). 
 242. In so concluding, I assume that Congress has power to authorize federal courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over all class members who have minimum contacts with the nation.  See supra 
Part III.C.5. 
 243. Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda have argued that certain fora cannot be trusted to 
properly litigate a collateral attack: 
Just as the array of potential fora invites proponents of collusive class settlements to seek 
the anomalous approving forum, the same array invites those hostile to the deal to seek 
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Congress likely has authority under Article III to permit removal to 
federal court of a suit premised on inadequate representation of an absent 
class member.244 
The cure offered by the American Law Institute is in any event 
worse than the supposed malady.  The Institute—and Professors 
Issacharoff and Nagareda—seem determined to sharply limit the ability 
of an absent class member to challenge even settlements that all 
concerned should have recognized were unreasonable.245  But neither the 
benefits of finality with respect to class judgments nor the possible 
misuse of collateral attack can justify a standard that would immunize 
from collateral attack class judgments that are manifestly unfair to absent 
class members who have relied on the promise of adequate 
representation.  Aggregate Litigation has many virtues, but its cramped 
understanding of the adequate-representation requirement and its effort 
to severely restrict the availability of collateral attack should be soundly 
rejected. 
 
                                                                                                                       
the forum anomalously inclined to allow the collateral challenger some extraordinary 
gain by threatening to blow up the entire settlement.  The stock in trade for this maneuver 
is to claim inadequate class representation and thereby to deny preclusive effect to the 
deal. . . . 
  The problem, then, is that the search for an anomalous forum might allow collateral 
attacks on class settlements to bust not only bad class judgments, but also good ones. 
Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1669–70.  But see Struve, supra note 90, at 2144 (noting 
that Professors Issacharoff and Nagareda present no evidence that anomalous state courts are a 
problem with respect to collateral attack).  The Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) sought to 
address the problem of the anomalous court with respect to certification by permitting defendants to 
easily remove a case from state to federal court.  Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 1665 (“CAFA 
expands the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts to turn this phenomenon on its head, 
effectively enabling the defendant, if she wishes, to use a change of forum to empower the negatives 
on the class certification question to trump the anomalous positive.”).  Because CAFA permits only 
a defendant to remove, it does not prevent a defendant and class counsel from seeking the approval 
of a collusive settlement by an anomalous state court.  Issacharoff & Nagareda, supra note 6, at 
1666–67 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2005)); Wolff, supra note 215, at 2126. 
 244. See Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989) (noting in the context of the federal 
officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1), that “it is the raising of a federal question in the 
officer’s removal petition that constitutes the federal law under which the action against the federal 
officer arises for Article III purposes”); see also Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of 
Federal Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 718 (1986) (“[I]n a long line of decisions, the 
Supreme Court held that a federal defense made a case ‘arise under’ federal law within the meaning 
of both article III” and the general removal provision of the now-defunct Judiciary Act of 1875.).  As 
previously noted, a collateral attack on a class judgment can often be conceptualized as an 
affirmative defense to the affirmative defense of preclusion asserted by the defendant.  See supra 
notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra Part II.C.3–5 (discussing the Agent Orange, BancBoston, and Epstein 
settlements). 
